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CONFLICT AND DISCORD: 
THE LABOUR PARTY, EUROPE AND 
CONSENSUS POLITICS 1960 - 1975 
This thesis concerns the Labour Party and British European Policy. While 
Labour, historically, has had a pluralistic structure and has been prone to 
internal division, in Government the Party felt compelled by the external 
environment within which it was operating, to maintain the 'consensus' 
view. It was able to do this because the post- war consensus was strong 
enough to cement it into the governmental process.^ Out of office, 
however. Labour opposed the same policies it had proposed in 
Government. By doing so the Party performed its constitutional role of 
opposition and was, more importantly, also able to maintain a semblance 
of Party unity. So before elections and while the Party is in power, the 
tendency is usually towards an ideological compromise around which the 
Party can unite, if only temporarily. In opposition, however, the ideological 
differences become more acute, there is more ideological debate and 
those on the extreme ends of either wing of the Party stand a better 
chance of influencing policy. Compromises made while in government 
may heighten ideological disputes once the Party loses an election, since 
a genuine compromise is almost impossible.^ Applying these insights to 
the seemingly perennial issue of Britain's relationship with Europe, our 
1 Nairn T. New Left Review No. 75 Sept. - Oct. London 1972 pp. 1-2. 
2 Bilski R. op cit. p. 308 
story is fundamentally about how Labour simultaneously dealt with the 
emerging consensus about Common Market membership in the 1960's 
and early 1970's, whilst also dealing with the abiding problem of party 
unity. In this thesis we examine how unity in the Labour Party was so 
difficult to achieve for the Party leadership during a period in which British 
governments were persistently confronted with the need to accommodate 
significant changes in Britain's global role. 
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INTRODUCTION 
CONFLICT AND DISCORD: 
THE LABOUR PARTY, EUROPE AND 
CONSENSUS POLITICS 1960 to 1975 
There can be no other political party in Western Europe that has as 
closely analysed as the British Labour Party. Since its birth Labour has 
suffered from a history chequered with both factionalism and disunity. So 
any arena that can furnish the elements of controversy and conflict so 
readily is clearly going to provide a suitable framework for an academic 
piece of research. Yet for a student of politics today, the very idea of 
linking New Labour with controversy and conflict may seem humorous, 
even less to attempt to undertake academic research. For unity and 
loyalty to the party leadership is now seen as more or less as all 
encompassing, with nearly all areas of party machinery having now had 
their responsibilities and functions truncated. Indeed ever since the early 
1980's Labour has gradually undergone a transformation in both its 
structure and policies. A comparative study of the Labour Party in 1975 
as opposed to today will reveal distinct differences. Why then choose the 
subject of British membership of the Common Market in which to place our 
discussions about party unity? Firstly, in the same way as the subject of 
Europe came to dominate the internal politics of the Conservative Party 
under John Major, so the issue of Europe brought similar pain and 
6 
anguish to the party as well. Beginning quietly following the first 
negotiations in 1961 and then speeding up during the second attempt in 
1967 to finally running out of control in the early to mid 1970's, the issue of 
Common Market entry divided and antagonised the party as no other 
issue. This established, we then should see how this story fits into the 
wider issue of the post-war consensus on British foreign policy. 
With a distinct Whitehall policy of refashioning Britains role in world affairs 
to Europe, we shall see how Labour contributed to sustaining that 
position. Yet with its pluralistic structures, how could it actually help in 
maintaining the British view on European affairs? The answer is simple. 
When in Government and freed from the 'handcuffs' of party democracy, it 
felt compelled by political reality to maintain an attractive set of conditions 
for the policy to continue. The post-war consensus was strong enough to 
'cement' Labour into the processes of government. In opposition, freed 
from the responsibilities of office, Labour was able to adopt a more hostile 
line to the Conservative Government's terms for entry. By adopting such 
an approach it found itself able to successfully appease both anti and pro-
Marketeers with party unity therefore being maintained. While there had 
been an acceptance of Britain having a world power role in international 
affairs, the main reason for such a reappraisal was the declining state of 
the British economy. Common Market entry was more a recognition of 
this than of any positive reasons for joining. 
The Labour Party too recognised the newly emerging analysis of Britains 
economic position. Under Gaitskell the Party combined nationalist rhetoric 
with a sense of party advantage in condemning the Conservative 
Governments proposals, seeing no reason to jeopardise party unity.^ Yet 
under Wilson, while initially hostile,'* the Party again led Britain into 
negotiations for similar reasons to those of Macmillan before.^ In 
particular. Labour played a crucial role in sustaining the consensus 
through two actions. Firstly, 68 Labour MPs broke the whip and 
supported Heath - thus saving him from defeat.^ Second, by proposing 
that a referendum be held over the issue in 1975. The decision to hold a 
referendum was taken for reasons of party unity and owed very little to 
any pro Market feeling. And in doing so allowed the Party to secure at 
least a semblance of unity. We shall conclude that it was possible for 
Labour to play a full role in maintaining the consensus, despite its 
structural and ideological difficulties, because Wilson's party managerial 
skills were flexible enough to keep the party together as well as ensure 
that the wider national need be accommodated. 
3 Robins L.J . The Reluctant Party:Labour and the E E C , 1961-1975 Hesl<eth & Sons Ormsl^irk 1979 p.52 
4 The Daily Express Sept. 23 1963 
5 George S . An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community OUR Oxford 1994 p. 37 
6 Kitzinger U. Diplomacy and Persuasion: how Britain joined the Common Market Thames & Hudson London 1973 p.388 
CHAPTER ONE 
CONFLICT AND DISCORD 
THE LABOUR PARTY,EUROPE AND 
CONSENSUS POLITICS 1960 - 1975 
1. Factional ism In The Labour Party 
The Labour Party has frequently been subject to some form of factional 
dispute since its birth a hundred years ago. Sharp disagreements have 
persisted over future 'leadership, doctrine and tactics.'"^ Its whole purpose 
as a political organisation has been questioned, with bitter debates taking 
place between competing Party organs.° Indeed, Labour has never really 
been a unitary organisation anyway.^ Historically, it is has been an 'ad 
hoc alliance'^" held together by a desire to break the 'parliamentary 
monopoly of a traditional ruling c lass ' .Th is was true early in its history, 
when the Labour Representation Committee (LRC) chose to reject 
Marxism in favour of parliamentary socialism. Since 1945 dissent over 
ideology has only served to sustain Labour's image as a party suffering 
7 Mackintosh J.P. 'Socialism or Social Democracy? The Choice For The Labour Party The Political Quarterly Vol. 43 No. 4 Oct. -
Dec. 1972 p. 470 Byrd P. T h e Labour Party And The European Community 1970-1975 The Journal of Common Market 
Studies Vol. 13 1975 pp. 469-470 
8 Shaw E. Discipline And Discord In The Labour Party The politics of managerial control in the Labour Party 1951 - 1987 MUP 
Manchester 1988 p. 3 
9 Bilski R. T h e Common Market and the Growing Strength of Labour's Left Wing' Government and Opposition 12 1977 p. 307 
10 Minkin L. The Labour Party Conference - A Study in the Politics of Intra Party Democracy Manchester University Press 1980 
p. 3 
11 Aitken I. 'The Structure of the Labour Party' in Kaufman G. (ed.) The Left-symposium Anthony Blond London 1966 p. 9 
from perpetual disunity. The best it was ever able to achieve was an 
uneasy discipline within the Parliamentary Party.^ ^ Both the trade unions 
and constituency parties were continual reminders of Labour's federal 
character and the divisions that this uneasy organisational form had 
persistently produced since the Party's earliest years. The debates over 
Europe and the Common Market were a clear example of this inherent 
factionalism. 
I) Ideological Factionalism 
Some argue that the famous compromise policy position reached between 
both 'Marxist' and 'Labourist' following the first meeting of the LRC.^ ^ only 
mirrors the whole Party's history, showing how the Labour Left has 
consistently been defeated in policy making. Miliband argued that a 
centrist faction whose main purpose was to keep Labour within the 
bounds of a 'Labourist' policy also joined the Labour Right and Labour 
Left. Both Miliband and Coates argue that any appearance of a genuine 
compromise between left and right can only be expected to yield the 
continued predominance of Labour Right p o l i c i e s . L e f t - Right 
alignments have remained the main feature of Labour politics dominating 
all areas of both policy thought and policy making. 
12 Piper JR . Backbench Rebellion, Party Government And Consensus Politics: The Case Of The Parliamentary Labour Party, 
1966 -1970 Parliamentary Affairs 27 Autumn 1974 Vol. XXVII No. 4 Hansard Society London, p. 454 
13 Pelling H. The Origins of the Labour Party, 1880 - 1900 OUP 2nd Edn. London 1965 pp. 119-123 
14 Miliband R. Parliamentary Socialism Allen & Unwin London 1961 pp. 344 - 355 See also Coates D. The Labour Party & The 
Struggle for Socialism C U P Cambridge 1974 
15 Minkin L. The Labour Party Conference MUP Manchester 1980 pp. 10-11 
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Labour's attitude to the notion of class has also left its mark as well. While 
both the left and right were content to see the Party as a vehicle for 
working class expression, for the latter it was seen as a road to 
'classlessness', whereas to the former it was seen as a way of achieving a 
working class victory over the capitalist system. In short, the question was 
whether the Party was to be concerned with attempts at managing society 
along capitalist lines or whether it was 'to adapt itself to the task of 
creating a socialist one.'^ ® 
II) Structural 
The Party Constitution was a source of dissension as well, with its 
allocation of power between the unions and the CLPs, and between the 
Annual Conference and the NEC. While its main aim was undoubtedly to 
create a stable party machine, it assumed a consensus that really never 
existed. And until the late 1960's, the Labour Right was usually able to 
dominate most of segments of the Party machinery through the use of the 
union 'bloc vote' exercised at Annual Conference.^^ During Labour's early 
years, divisions between the unions and other federated organisations 
were also considerable. Not only did the unions have the votes to 
overcome any internal opposition, but also until the end of the Second 
World War, the unions consistently adopted a more cautious attitude 
16 Miliband R. op cit. p. 344 
17 Seyd P. & Whiteley P. Labours Grass Roots - The Politics of Party Membership Clarendon Press London 1992 p. 19 
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towards party policy than could be said of any other section.However, 
the idea that a persistent antagonism characterised the relationship 
between trade unions and CLPs can be challenged in two directions. 
Union support for NEC policies had not always been monolithic. 
Opposition to NEC Conference resolutions on unilateralism in 1960 saw 
the leadership defeated t w i c e . I n this instance there was an identifiable 
group of unions which could be linked with the Labour Left (although not, 
of course, on every issue).^° These debates as well as those over Clause 
Four showed that the political battle was usually won by the section that 
stood closest to the Party's traditional values. It also showed Labour's 
failure to lure a significant section away from as Drucker has called, 'the 
old defensive working class ethos."^^ 
III) Party Unity 
Party unity has not always been regarded as always electorally 
important.^^ It has been viewed as important enough for others to be an 
appropriate subject for discussion. One survey asked working class 
supporters to rank in importance sixteen statements describing the party. 
The characteristic 'has a united team of top leaders' was placed in eighth 
place by Labour respondents, with twenty per cent rating this as the most 
important party characteristic. While seeing disputes as acceptable, the 
18 Panitch V. 'Ideology and Integration' Political Studies 19 1971 Vol.19 Clarendon Press Oxford p. 219 
19McKenzie R.T. British Political Parties 2nd edn. revised Heineman London 1964 pp. 612-617 
20 Harrison M. Trade Unions and the Labour Party Since 1945 Allen & Unwin London 1960 pp.211-213. 
21 Drucker H.M. Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party Allen & Unwin London 1979 p. 108 
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Labour Right notes that the Party should 'seek to bring (disputes) to a 
conclusion so that voters could know precisely where Labour stood.'^^ In 
contrast, the Labour Left views party unity as involving the approval of the 
status quo in terms of power and policy. The Party Leadership is also 
unacceptable to them for it merely symbolises the power of the Labour 
Right over the party structures. Instead they prefer to stress the value of 
divergent political opinions as well as the importance of 'ginger groups' 
within the Party.^ "* 
Labour's inability to remain consistently in office also constituted another 
cause of friction. Electoral defeats not only deprive the leadership of 
prestige and authority;^^ they also afford the wider Party the opportunity to 
indulge in internecine warfare over who exactly is to blame for electoral 
failure. Disillusionment swept the party, with defeats in 1951, 1955 and 
1959 only serving to compound the move towards factionalism which 
electoral disappointment had unleashed. The onset of the 1964 Election 
only imposed some restraints on factionalism, as did its eventual narrow 
victory.^^ 
22 Abrams M. & Rose R. Must Labour Lose? Penguin Harmondsworth 1960 pp. 13 
23 Crosland C.A.R. op cit. pp. 149 & 156 
24 Janosik E . Constituency Labour Parties in Britain Pall Mall Press London 1968 pp. 35 -41 
25 Rose R. op cit. pp. 145 -146 
26 Janosik E. op cit. pp. 85 - 97 
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Factional disputes typified Labour's internal politics throughout the Party's 
debates over Britain's entry into the Common Market. These debates 
should be seen from two overlapping perspectives: conflict amongst key 
party institutions and conflict between the Labour Right and Labour Left. 
While the issue of entry created neither mode of conflict, Europe 
highlighted and exacerbated the capacity for political tension that already 
e x i s t e d . I t was almost inevitable that the Party would experience 
difficulties in maintaining unity as the debate polarised between pro- and 
anti-Market lobbies. 
Having now established that Labour was prone to internal divisions, it is 
necessary to demonstrate that despite the disunity Labour was still able to 
play a significant part in maintaining the consensus view held amongst 
British foreign policy makers - centrally that British economic decline 
necessitated entry into the Common Market. Yet to illustrate this one first 
must establish whether a political consensus actually existed during this 
period. 
2. Post War Consensus Polit ics? 
There is a difficulty about using the term 'consensus' as a synonym for 
cross party agreement. After all, disagreement about 'ends and means' is 
27 Daniels P and Ritchie E. The Poison'd Chalice - The European issue in British party politics in Jones P. (ed) Party, Parliament 
& Personality - E s s a y s presented to Hugh Berrington Routledge London 1995 p.86 
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the 'life blood of polities'. Political discourse arises inevitably from human 
interaction and the clash of individual and group interests. Politics is the 
activity of reconciling those interests and establishing a common set of 
goals for society. By doing so an obvious problem will then follow as the 
idea of 'consensus' is usually going to be at odds with any political activity. 
In other words, was nothing at stake in general elections? It is possible, 
therefore, to suggest that a 'consensus' in post-war British politics never 
existed. 
Academics such as Pimlott argue that 'consensus' 'is a mirage, an illusion 
that rapidly fades the closer one gets to it,'^ ^ seeing the idea used by 
those who wish to look nostalgically to a 'golden era','^° High levels of 
party identification and class-based voting are supposed to show the 
sharp differences between the political parties.^ ^ In similar vein, others 
argue that party disagreement had been alive during wartime and that the 
differing interpretations given to coalition policy after 1943 make it difficult 
to endorse the idea that shared common beliefs ever existed. It is argued 
that while both main parties accepted the mixed economy, its ultimate 
28 Kavanagh D. & Morris P. Consensus Politics From Attlee to Major Institure of Contemporary British History Blackwell Oxford 
1994 p. 10 
29 Pimlott B. in Jones H. & Kandiah M. The Myth of Consensus Macmiilan London 1996 p. 140. Taylor Gooby P. Public 
Opinion, Ideology and State Welfare Routledge Paul 1985 pp. 55 - 59 
30 Ellison N. 'Consensus Here, Consensus There...but not Consensus Everywhere: The Labour Party, Equality and Social Policy 
in the 1950's' in Jones H. & Kandiah M. op cit. p. 17 
31 Kavanagh D. & Morris P. op cit. p.10. 
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purpose remained a subject of intense disagreement.^^ One historian 
notes that the 'Second World War was not the crucible of lasting political 
consensus'^^ as the parties were as far apart on social issues as they had 
been before 1939.^ "^  It is also suggested that Labour's post-war reforms 
were set firmly in the party's own 'labourist' tradition.^^ The assumptions 
the Labour Government brought to power in 1945 were different in 
important respects from the 'Whitehall consensus', with Labour's attitude 
revealing a determination to achieve the social and economic reform 
programme which had been extensively discussed during the 1930's and 
early 1940's.^ ® The War was, therefore, certainly not the 'Crucible of 
lasting political consensus.'^^ 
If consensus means elite agreement about the legitimacy of political 
institutions, then perhaps it has always existed, as revolutionary politics 
has yet to succeed in destroying our accepted constitutional 
arrangements.Moreover, It is unhelpful to understand 'consensus' as 
only meaning the absence of disagreement. Rather it is more appropriate 
to think of consensus as a set of generally accepted parameters in which 
32 Jeffreys K. The Churchill coalition and wartime politics,1940-1945 MUP Manchester 1991 p. 196-197. 
33 Brooke S . Labour's War OUP Oxford 1992 p.342 
34 Jeffreys K. 'British Politics and Social Policy During The Second World War* in Historical Journal Vol.30 No.1 p.143 
35 Lowe R. op cit. p.340 
36 Durbin E . New Jerusalems The Labour Party and the Economics of Democratic Socialism Routledge & Kegan Paul London 
1985 p.87 
37 Ibid. p342 
38 Kavanagh D. & Morris P. op cit. pp. 1 - 4 
16 
certain 'key assumptions were shared and in which policy options were 
consequently limited.'^^ The Second World War played a significant role in 
creating a shared set of assumptions between the two main political 
parties about future political action. The War acted as a catalyst for the 
implementation of ideas that had been developed before 1939 and which 
now gave birth to a post-war policy consensus. Addison argues that a 
range of policy areas saw the emergence of a broad consensus about the 
need for a 'fairer society - especially one which boasted higher levels of 
welfare as well as full employment.'*^ While the rhetorical debate between 
state socialism and laissez-faire capitalism may have continued, in 
practice both Conservative and Labour parties by-passed 'most of it in 
favour of pragmatic reform in a mixed economy."*^ The War produced the 
new middle ground upon which the parties could compete."*^ Smith 
suggests that a set of common 'beliefs about the priorities of a National 
Health Service' were being 'widely shared'."*^ So central was social policy 
to this post-war agreement that some simply refer to it as 'the welfare 
state consensus'."*"* Dicey once said that the Conservative and Liberal 
Parties divided on differences that are important but not fundamental. 
Indeed, According to studies of party manifestos, the parties steadily 
39 Dutton D. op cit. p.7 
40 Dutton D. British Politics Soince 1945-The Rise and Fall of Consensus Basil Blackwell Oxford 1991 pp. 9-10. 
41 Addison P.The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War Jonathan Cape London 1975 p.14 
42 Ibid. pp. 275 - 278 
43 Fox D.M. 'The National Health Service and the Second World War: the elaboration of consensus' in Smith HL. (ed.) War and 
Social change - British society in the Second World War MUP Manchester 1986 p.135 -136 
44 Pierson C . op cit. p. 139 
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moved towards each other during the 1950's and 1960's/^ Addison 
probably has this characterisation in mind when he talks of a 'post war 
settlement' on policy between both Conservative and Labour Parties/® 
Disputes were less about absolutes and more about questions of 'more or 
less'. Consensus, therefore, is not meant to imply total agreement, but 
rather that the Conservative Left and Labour Right dominated their 
respective parties, converging towards the centre ground of politics/^ 
Similarly we should not just see the post-war consensus as being about 
two political parties whether in government or in opposition, but also as a 
period of substantive agreement within the machinery of Government 
itself® As such, Ellison points out that political agreement was sustained 
by a Whitehall system whose commitment to Keynesian macro-economic 
policy begun to gradually permeate economic policy making in the last two 
years of the war. It is significant that in the early years of Churchill's 
government, advocates of Keynesianism such as Sir Edwin Plowden and 
Sir Robert Hall continued to flourish within the Treasury. Both were 
Keynesian economists and thought 'in macro-economic terms about full 
employment and balance of payments' stability."^^ A central foundation, 
therefore, for the creation of a consensus lay in part in the key area of 
45 Thomas J . C . T h e Changing Nature of Partisan Divisions in the West European Journal of Political Research 7/4 1979 
46 Kavanagh D. & Morris P. op cit. p. 13 
47 Bogdanor V .& Skildelsky R. (eds.) The Age of Affluence Macmillan 1970 p. 11 
48 Dutton D. op cit. pp. 7-8 
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Whitehall. And, as the 1950's unfolded, we can certainly see the trend of 
a foreign policy consensus continuing through the commitment of another 
leading Whitehall mandarin. Sir Frank Lee. Convinced that Britain's 
economic future lay in Europe, Lee persuaded the then Prime Minister, 
Harold Macmillan in the late 1950's, of the necessity of Britain entering the 
Common Market °^ Hennessy notes that Lee could be 'very persuasive'. 
At the Board of Trade in the early 1950's, he convinced his President, 
Peter Thorneycroft, away from imperial preference and converting him 
instead into a free trader. Thorneycroft, primed by Lee, persuaded the 
Cabinet and finally, with much greater difficulty, the Conservative Party 
Conference. It is significant that Britain's first application to join was 
primarily based on a report Sir Frank Lee compiled.Usually when an 
issue reached ministerial level, a small range of options would have been 
selected with the information far less detailed.^^ Through such an 
approach, civil servants were able to establish the parameters or 
'governmental ethos' in which decisions were made." 
Having established that a consensus did indeed exist, it is now important 
to see how it related to Britain's policy towards Europe. It will be shown 
that by the 1950's British foreign policy gave support for the US and the 
49 Seldon A. Churchill's Indian Summer: The Conservative Government 1951 -1955 Hodder & Stoughton London 1981 p. 165 
50 Roll E. Crowded Hours Faber and Faber London 1985 p. 106 
51 In Hennessy P. Whitehall Seeker & Warburg London 1989 p. 160 
52 S e e Jenkins R.J. Sunday Times 17.1.1971 
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Commonwealth, as well as the beginnings of a European stance. By the 
early 1960s, with relationships with both the US and Commonwealth no 
longer helping the British economy, Britain began to realign itself towards 
Europe and, in particular, with membership of the Common Market. 
4. The European Policy Consensus 
While early economic results after the War looked encouraging, a US led 
new global economic system was created that began to test British 
economic competitiveness. After the Korean War boom, commodity 
prices sagged while industrial economies saw sustained expansion -
especially within the newly formed Common Market. The position of 
Sterting also began to be affected as well. Whereas in 1900 Sterling was 
a leading currency, by the early 1950s, with the Commonwealth becoming 
ever more independent so the status of Sterling was further reduced to 
that of only a 'negotiated' currency. The trade gap, therefore, widened as 
Britain faced renewed world competition as well as a number of balance of 
payments deficits. The Suez Crisis merely provided a stimulus for major 
shifts in policy within the three circles of power towards Europe, not least 
towards the US. 
53 Rose R. op cit. pp. 112 -113 
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I) Redefining Bri tain 's Role 
A significant factor to explain the shift in British policy making about 
Europe was the support of Washington who had long since favoured 
moves towards European unity. The US clearly perceived the extent of 
Britain's economic decline and was conscious that, if Britain remained 
outside Europe, America's diplomatic tasks in Europe would be much 
harder to fulfil. When Macmillan visited the US in 1961, he found US 
foreign policy makers enthusiastic about a British application for entry. 
Yet the debate in Britain tended to fall between the immediate problems 
arising from occupation and the vaguer aspiration to prevent a German 
military revival. Not only were long-term solutions such as European 
integration deemed less urgent, it was still felt that entry would have a 
deleterious effect on agricultural markets, the Commonwealth and the 
'special relationship'. On the other hand, London noted that Europe could 
constitute a 'third force' capable of exerting international leverage, leaving 
Britain as an 'insignificant "has been".^^ Entry provided, therefore, a 
framework within which Britain could engage with problems which it alone 
lacked the cohesion to tackle.^ ® When talks began in September 1961, 
Britain made it clear that it accepted the Rome Treaty in broad principle, 
whilst also seeking special provisions for the Commonwealth, domestic 
agriculture and EFTA. 
54 Camps M. Britain and the European Communities, 1955 - 63 OUP Oxford 1964 pp. 336 - 337 
55 Ibid, p.338 
56 Holland R.The Pursuit of Greatness Britain And The World, 1900-1970 Fontana Press London 1991 p.290 
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This partial acceptance of a European vocation, however, proved 
insufficient for General de Gaulle who, in delivering his veto, claimed that 
Britain's economic and political orientation was still too different from that 
of other member States. The Nassau agreement between Britain and the 
US had demonstrated to the French Britain's preference for a transatlantic 
relationship over a European one.'^ ^ Not only had Britain moved too late it 
had also moved for largely negative reasons - the fear that the Common 
Market would become the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance." 
Britain's attitude was one of a 'fearful agnosticism about the future of 
Europe and Britain's future in it.'" Thus Britain proved unable to square 
the circles - to strengthen its links with the US whilst also engineer British 
entry. 
However, in the early 1960's, links were also weakening rapidly with the 
Commonwealth.®" The British policy shift towards de-colonisation by the 
mid 1950s partly reflected the changing international setting, and partly 
changes in the British economy. Currency convertibility, Europe's 
industrial boom and Britain's growing interest in Europe conspired to 
refashion attitudes to traditional patterns of trade. The Commonwealth's 
economic importance to Britain lessened as British commerce failed to 
57 Clarke P. Hope and Glory Britain 1900 - 1990 Penguin London p. 281 . 
58 Butler L.J.'Winds of change: Britain, Europe and the Commonwealth 1959-1961' op cit. pp. 159-160 
59 Denman R. op cit. p.225 
60 Tomlinson J . Public Policy And The Economy Since 1900 Clarendon Press London 1990 p.243 
22 
adjust itself to changing trading conditions.®^ This meant that Britain was 
now 'facing the wrong way, with its back turned' on the expanding markets 
it most needed if it was to keep pace with the growth of internal trade.®^ 
Whitehall's faith in the Commonwealth was also damaged by the 
exclusion of South Africa over apartheid in 1961, which showed the 
Commonwealth's growing independence of UK wishes," for whom the 
continued presence of such a regime was unacceptable.®"* With these 
policy shifts occurring, why did the Labour Party play such a significant 
role in maintaining this European policy consensus? 
5. Labour's European Policy 
To explain Labour's European policy between 1960 and 1975, one first 
needs to look at the Party both in opposition and in Government. In doing 
so we need to introduce the term 'internal' and 'governmental' policy-
making. The former relates to policy-making in opposition and shows that 
wider political considerations are perceived to be weak enough to allow 
issues such as party unity some degree of resonance. It will be shown 
that a major objective was to achieve unity by adopting classical 
opposition behaviour, for example, by showing the Party to be competent 
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and thus fit to govern in the eventuality of electoral success.^^ 
"Governmental' policy making, on the other hand, involves the 
government having to formulate realistic and practical policies. While 
issues relevant in opposition remained pertinent, it is here that 
government leaders needed to take a more balanced view between both 
the party and national interests. Labour's policy decisions over Europe 
during this period closely mirror both 'internal' and 'governmental' 
positions. 
However, in order to demonstrate this, we first have to establish that the 
debates that took place during this period were merely a continuum of 
those that had occurred straight after the War. While the enthusiasm of 
victory in war and victory for the first majority Labour Government 
appeared to offer a chance for Britain to continue as a great power, the 
spirit of party unity soon ceased with both left and right resuming more 
entrenched, exhibiting attitudes more typical of the 1930s. As Drucker 
notes, 'That holiday came to an abrupt end with the electoral victory of 
1945'. 
While in the two previous periods, conflicts could always be explained 
away by the fact of being either in a minority government or in opposition, 
after 1945 that excuse was no longer available - the Government had to 
65 Brazier R. Constitutional Practice 2nd Edn Clarendon Press Oxford 1994 p. 163 
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begin to explain to its supporters why it was making 'non-socialist' 
choices.^ ® Whereas in opposition the party could theoretically adopt 
whatever position it like, in government the Party had no choice but to 
consider the national interest more closely. This is a crucial period if we 
want to look at divisions over Europe in these years. Europe became 
embroiled in clashes between the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and his 
many leftwing critics, and can be seen as an issue where hopeful pre-war 
declarations failed to be realised. While there had been calls for Britain to 
help produce European unity in order to create a post-war peace, the 
Party's (and indeed the nation's) mood over Europe at this time was 
changing rapidly, with many now losing interest in the whole concept of 
federalism.®^ Dalton, for example, argued that as Labour had fought so 
hard to win power for socialism, it should not now throw it away to allow 
Europe to decree that Britain should return to the inter-war years of trade 
depression'^ ® Instead, the Party had to think 'first of all of the 
Commonwealth,®^ and that initiatives to create European unity should not 
be allowed to interfere with the newly established welfare state.^° 
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A deeply ingrained belief in the greatness of Britain led the Party to cast 
aside any real move towards integration. Indeed, in the same manner as 
Dalton, Bevin 'sensed instinctively that the Schuman Plan raised again the 
spectre of federalism, rather than the gradualist, functionalist method 
favoured by Britain'.''^ Yet many believed that the European Union was an 
issue in which a strong British lead might well have produced positive 
results. The lead was not given although statements by leaders of the 
Labour movement created hopes that it would be. For more than thirty 
years many on the Labour Left had promoted the idea of a supra-national 
authority to control the vested interests of the capitalist nation states. 
When the Labour Government finally came to office, it found that workers 
had a vested interest in the idea of national sovereignty instead 
The reasons behind the various political stands taken by Labour during 
this period cannot then be detached from a set of beliefs, which 
characterised British society in general. Though Britain had once been a 
great world power, by the late 1950's it was becoming increasingly clear 
that this was no longer the case. While the public now concluded that 
Britain, having been a grade one world power, was now a grade two world 
power, in global politics there is, of course, no such thing as a 'grade two 
global power'. It was this contradiction that managed to delay for a 
generation the British withdrawal from 'distant theatres, the abnegation of 
71 Morgan K.O. Labour in Power 1945 - 1951 Clarendon Press Oxford 1984 p. 419 
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the role of international financier and adjustment to the realities of what 
was...still a powerful position.'^^ What had happened to federalist cause 
within the Party then was but a mirror, where the wider image of Britain's 
self consciousness as a great power was reflected. 
Debates between the pro- and anti-Market factions were as much to do 
with the direction of socialism as they were to do with aspirations about 
Europe, with Europe being only 'the tip of the iceberg'. One Labour Left 
MP argues that those who divide over Europe, also divide on the 'basic 
issues of public ownership, relations with the Trade Unions, Party 
Democracy' The position can be described as follows. Anti-Marketeers' 
suggested that entry would frustrate the progress towards socialism and 
would interfere with Parliament's legislative powers.^ "* Second, with a 
declining military capacity as well as fading special relationship, Britain 
should be regarded as possessing a moral authority both within the 
Commonwealth and the Common Market as well. It was argued that 
British Governments should legislate as they wished and that the 
maintenance of UK sovereignty in the international sphere was dependent 
upon this very fact. Therefore, the questions of sovereignty, the 
preservation of Britain's world role, and political ethos of European 
organisations were all core strands of opposition. 
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Pro-Marketeers, on the other hand, argued that Britain had to reassess its 
imperial role and train its sights on the Common Market. By 1957 some 
argued that, as Europe was the home of socialism then the failure 
success or failure of socialism in Britain would be decisive for the 
movement in Europe. 'If it fails British socialists would stand isolated.'^^ 
European reconstruction had highlighted even further the disintegrating 
economic links with the Commonwealth and insubstantial basis of the 
'special relationship'. Roy Jenkins argued that the special relationship 
was ludicrous when the US actually wanted Britain to enter.^ ® Britain's 
political and economic decline was well understood - Britain was 
uncompetitive and needed a more stimulating set of trading links.^ ^ 
Arguments against the loss of sovereignty, for pro-Marketeers, seemed 
'nationalistic',^® seeing Europe as offering the prospect of modernisation.^^ 
It seems clear, therefore, that the ability to maintain some degree of unity 
amongst Labour's two ideological wings was going to be crucial, as events 
were later to show. After the defeats over Clause Four and defence 
policy. Labour now found unity under Gaitskell as 'the Commonwealth' 
party. The Labour leaders speech to the 1962 Annual Conference 
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appeared to gain the support of many sections of Labour Left anti-
Marketeers into supporting his increasingly hostile approach to Common 
Market entry. All this from an issue that was ultimately to come to nothing. 
Had the Conservative Governments negotiations produced any 
agreement, the party could have split, with the Labour suffering yet 
another crisis. Thus Europe provided Labour with a 'healing potion', 
providing that it did not develop into an issue demanding a clear choice. 
Unfortunately victory for Labour in the 1964 General Election changed all 
that. 
In stark contrast to Gaitskell, who presided over 'domestic' foreign policy, 
Wilson had to produce a policy that worked in Government. As far as he 
was concerned, if Britain's application to join in 1967 had been successful, 
then his subsequent during this period behaviour would have been judged 
as purposeful. Failure, on the other hand, would at least limit criticism 
because at least he could justifiably claim that the option of entry had 
been explored. The advantage of not making a greater commitment was 
that any failure in the Governments negotiations would result in a policy 
vacuum. Indeed, after losing the 1970 Election, political opponents 
attacked Labour and the media for having no European policy, with the 
Party's position had been one of no decision. This strategy was, of 
course, completely rational for a major political party that suffered from 
endemic conflict, with leaders seeing advantages in avoiding disunity until 
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a real choice need be made. This plain fact epitomises the choices that 
faced Labour leaderships during this period. Similarly, Labour's decision 
on the principle of entry was to be made simultaneously with a decision 
that found any negotiated terms acceptable. Until such time why 
antagonise anyone until a real decision had to be made? By 1975 the 
party ceased feuding, returned to Government promising unity on the 
platform of re-negotiated terms with the couplet of a referendum. 
6. Conclusions 
This thesis concerns the Labour Party and it's contribution to the evolution 
of post-war British foreign policy towards Europe. While Labour 
historically, has had a pluralistic structure and been repeatedly prone to 
internal factionalism, in Government it has felt more compelled by external 
governmental factors to maintain the Whitehall consensus view of what 
British foreign policy towards Europe should be. While out of office 
enabled the party to concentrate almost solely on maintaining Party unity 
(whether this meant Labour opposing the same policies it had previously 
pursued or not), in government the post-war consensus was strong 
enough to cement the Party towards accepting the perceived wisdom in 
Whitehall.^" Whether in government or in opposition, the Party's policy on 
Europe usually drifted towards some ideological compromise around 
which the Party could unite. In opposition, however, the ideological 
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differences became more acute, with there being far greater interest in 
ideology. The result being that those on the extreme ends of either 
ideological wing stood a better chance of influencing policies. Conversely 
any compromises made while the Party was in government were always 
likely to heighten any ideological disputes once the Party lost an election -
since a genuine compromise between the Party's different component 
parts almost impossible. Although a compromise was necessary to 
enable the Government to function, once Labour was out of office, the 
ideological differences came to the surface.®^ In 1962 Gaitskell 
condemned the terms for entry, seeing no reason to jeopardise newly 
found Party unity®^ or to support a tired looking government. Though 
Wilson was just as hostile, he too applied for entry seeing it as a possible 
solution to the country's economic problems.In the passage of the 1973 
Bill, 68 Labour MPs by defying the Whip saved the government from 
defeat.^ "* In 1975 Wilson supported the Yes vote in the referendum, thus 
preserving the wider consensus view.°^ 
In the following chapters we will look in detail at Labour's divisions and 
how unity was so difficult to achieve. We will establish that there was a 
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consensus and detail its crucial relationship to British European policy. 
Here we will show that up to the 1950s Britain still saw itself as a world 
power seeing its interests lying with the US, the Empire and only loosely 
with Europe. However, with an ever-worsening economy, a change of 
policy was clearly going to be inevitable, with Britain low seeing Common 
Market entry as a possible solution. We develop how the Labour Party 
managed to deal with this position as it continued to unfold. We shall 
conclude by arguing that, despite its internal divisions, was able to counter 
balance the needs of the nation against those of party concern so that the 
newly evolving consensus view of how Britain related to the rest of the 
world could be maintained. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
G A I T S K E L L AND THE 
NEED FOR UNITY 
1. Introduction 
From 1960 to 1963 the Labour Party opposed the Government's position 
over the Common Market and thus was able to maintain internal unity. In 
1962 Gaitskell condemned the terms for entry, seeing no reason to either 
jeopardise newly found unity^^ nor support a tired looking government.®^ 
After internal battles over Clause Four and defence policy, Europe was 
going to provide Labour with a healing ointment, so long as it did not 
develop into an issue demanding a clear choice. Realising the 
Conservat ive Governments negotiations would fail, Gaitskell 's actions 
were a clear attempt to garner any electoral benefits that might accrue 
f rom such a policy failure. Fully aware that his references to the Atlantic 
Al l iance would certainly provoke angry reaction amongst member states, 
Gaitskell 's move, therefore, from passive supporter to that of anti-
Marketeer was a tactical one to win internal unity in anticipation of a 
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for thcoming election. W e need to place, therefore, this subject in its 
appropriate international and domestic political context, by showing how 
debates in Whitehal l over Europe were mirrored in the Labour Party and 
further, that the Party confronted the issue of Europe at a t ime when it was 
most heavily divided. The leadership's main concern was to find an issue 
that could be used as a vehicle to heal the lingering wounds both of the 
Clause Four and defence debates. It is this desire for party unity that 
drove Gaitskell and as such dictates the course of this section. 
2. Antecedents For Disunity 
The Conservat ive Government 's announcement in 1961 to apply for 
Common Market entry represented a major shift in foreign policy. Until 
that point policy had been rooted in the 'three spheres of influence' with 
Europe subservient to the dictates of both the Commonwealth and US. 
Experiences during the late 1950s created a dynamic; however, the logic 
of which was to re-evaluate Britain's world role. The Suez fiasco, fears of 
the US engaging in dialogue with Europe over Britain as well as 
Commonweal th 's economic fragility can all be seen as marking this move. 
The major political parties were slow, however, to recognise these 
consequences. Labour responded to these issues at a t ime when it was 
both ideologically and structurally divided, in opposition and seemingly 
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with little chance of entering government in the near future.^® The Party 
appeared unable to respond to the growing economic prosperity and 
social mobility that was being harnessed by the Conservative 
Government,®^ with some wondering whether it would ever be elected 
again.^° Clarke notes that it was hard to accept that the Party's 'own self-
inflicted wounds were unimportant in denying it office.' Party splits 
appeared endemic and seemingly impossible to conceal.®^ 
After 'the t rauma of election defeat'^^ in 1959, it was argued that Labour 
had to adopt more modern policies and not simply wait for the conversion 
of society to social ism to happen if it ever wished to govern Britain again. 
The spectacular 1963 Liberal by-election win in the Conservative 
stronghold of Orpington merely confirmed Labour's failure to attract middle 
class voters.^'* And whi le Gaitskell argued for internal 'modernisation'®^ he 
was forced to back down in the attempt to abandon Clause IV with many 
still believing this would mean the end of socialism. In fact, many believed 
that he had underest imated the notion of public ownership as a dominant 
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idea within the party's 'socialist myth' and the appeal of Clause IV as the 
formal expression of that myth.^^ Others believed the venture to be 
tactically ill conceived, arguing that as the Party had existed amicably with 
an ambiguous policy of a mixed economy why then change now The 
real quest ion was how long could Labour afford this policy ambiguity to 
cont inue? 
3 . Labour And Tlie Common iVIarket 
1. Overview 
Europe's place in Labour's internal politics was not straightforward and 
fitted poorly into any Left and Right divide.®^ Though the issue related to 
the changing nature of Britain's world role, it involved no clear-cut 
quest ion of moral versus political leadership. If the Government were 
successful in future entry negotiations, then Britain's relationship with the 
Commonweal th and the US would need to be reconsidered. This did not 
immediately rule out entry for those who believed that Britain could 
provide political leadership. Moreover, whi le moral leadership would have 
little role to play in such an economic association, many on the left still 
favoured entry if only on the grounds of international co-operation. There 
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was another layer of complexity as well. While the Bevanite disputes of 
the 1950s had often centred on defence matters, there was still the 
broader debate concerning Britain's post-imperial role. The Labour Left's 
att i tude tended to be coloured by an anti-American perspective, while the 
Labour Right nurtured a strong Atlanticist bias. It was this that led 
Gaitskell to place his leadership on the line over defence,®^ by successfully 
reversing the policy over unilateralism at the 1961 Conference. He was 
understandably unwil l ing, therefore, to squander this newly found unity in 
pursuit of yet another internal squabble - this t ime over E u r o p e . H e 
realized that Europe was an issue that could be used to create a unified 
and electorally credible political party.^°^ Gaitskell 'would judge the issue 
when it arose by the approach which would ensure the maximum electoral 
advantage. ' This point should not be over looked. The position looked 
favourable - he had a loyal Right wing and an issue that was finely 
b a l a n c e d . T h e ultimate solution, therefore, would be to put forward a 
mildly anti-Market line in order to carry both wings of the Party. Here was 
opposit ionist politics in operation with the need to maintain Party unity 
taking priority over Europe itself. 
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In a sense Gaitskell v iewed the possibility of closer Western European 
integration simply in terms of wider Cold War security implications. Both 
he and Bevan shared a residual belief in Britain's global responsibilities, 
especial ly where the Commonweal th was c o n c e r n e d , a n d to this extent 
they regarded the Common Market as something of an irrelevance. On 
the other hand, many on the Labour Right argued that Britain needed to 
develop a more realistic world role within Europe. For the first t ime since 
1945 a powerful lobby in the Party was proposing a strategic readjustment 
'cutting the international cloth to fit the domestic economic reality.'^^"^ 
These divisions highlighted the problems caused for Britain by European 
integration. Britain's post war position comprising the sterling area as an 
economic unit, the Commonweal th and the 'special relationship' had to be 
balanced with its new role as a European power. This conflict, in turn, 
created other difficulties. Given the other roles Britain was called on to 
play, what would be its commitment to Europe? There was a suspicion on 
the Cont inent that Britain would not be able to make a positive 
contr ibut ion. On the other hand, the economic dynamic being created in 
Europe forced Britain to realise that entry was essential. This led naturally 
to a second problem - what form the association of nations would take. 
Many in the Party saw the Rome Treaty as a 'capitalist club' that might 
prevent any sort of internal planning and progressive social policy by a 
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future Labour Government.^°^ The counter argument was that only if a 
Labour Government was working actively within the Common Market 
could Europe develop along democratic socialist lines. There was also 
d isagreement over the effect that entry would might have on existing 
trading patterns. Pro-Marketeers maintained that entry would open up 
new markets and that closer ties would not adversely affect the 
Commonweal th . Anti-Marketeers, on the other hand, believed that entry 
would not offset the losses in the Commonweal th. There was, however, 
no certain way of predicting on which side of the European debate the 
protagonists in the other debates would fall. Those on the Labour Left 
tended to be anti-Market, with those on the Labour Right being pro-
Market. By 1960 with the first serious Shadow Cabinet studies taking 
place on Europe, Party opinion began to move against entry.^°^ 
II. Gai tskei l 's 'Balancing Act ' Begins 
Whi le Britain may have abandoned military and economic independence, 
the formal merger of decision making seemed for many in the Party to go 
against the grain even of many 'who on most other grounds would like to 
see Britain join the Community.'^°^ Three out of four respondents, in one 
survey, were opposed in some way to entry, while less than one 
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respondent in five gave any s u p p o r t . T h e reasons mirrored the wider 
debate - the Rome Treaty was a capitalist 'device' that would make 
achieving social ism in Britain even more d i f f i c u l t . G a i t s k e l l opposed 
giving any public declaration on Common Market entry, believing it was 
unlikely to become an electoral issue whilst also fearing that a strong line 
f rom him would result in further factionalism.^^° Once negotiations had 
begun in 1961 , Europe came to the front of the political stage, 
endanger ing the very basis of Labour's fragile unity. And while Gaitskell's 
initial handling of the issue caused few p r o b l e m s , s i g n s of unrest were 
soon becoming apparent, in response to Labour's agreed conditions for 
entry one pro-Marketeer, Roy Jenkins, resigned from the front bench. The 
Government 's condit ions of entry seemed to Gaitskell to undermine the 
posit ion of the Commonweal th . He did fear, however, the prospect of yet 
another split, with all the electoral problems that brought. The ultimate 
consequence, as we shall see, was an address to the 1962 Annual 
Conference that clearly marked the Party out on a distinctly anti-Market 
course.^^^ 
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In contrast to the defence issue, if Gaitskell had supported entry he would 
have faced a battle with virtually all sections of the Party. On the other 
hand, if he came out against entry he risked alienating the Labour Right. 
One leading Gaitskellite, Denis Howell, maintained that the Leader's 
posit ion was designed to unify the Party and in this respect he was 
probably right. Gaitskell accepted the aspirations of the European cause 
whilst also having a deep suspicion for the implications if Britain jo ined. In 
a letter to Kennedy he noted that the arguments were evenly balanced, 
that the balance would only tilt in favour of entry if Labour's conditions 
were met and that If he was to urge either unconditional entry or total 
opposit ion the Party would have divided. He also felt that the chances of 
the French agreeing to entry were remote.""* By relating his arguments to 
the terms of entry, it would be possible to offend neither lobby. With these 
aims in mind, he played the 'waiting game'. He thought that the prospects 
of a Europe developing in the way he wanted depended on the terms and 
that if these proved unsatisfactory, the loss would not be very great. He 
also bel ieved that Conservative division would be too great for Macmillan 
to proceed anyway. Terms good enough for Macmillan to carry his own 
party would also be good enough for Gaitskell to carry his; and without 
such terms the talks would collapse with only Labour benefi t ing."^ 
Gaitskell was walking a tight rope because if he supported either lobby 
then the balancing act that kept both sides together would have been 
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endangered. This was going to be difficult as the various party pressure 
groups were intensifying their campaigning. The Forward Britain 
Movement advocated alternative policies to entry, such as to 'oppose 
nuclear tests in any part of the world.'^^^ One pro-Market group, the 
Campaign for Democratic Socialism believed Britain's destinies were 
' inextricably bound up with those of a resurgent and united Europe.' 
Entry was seen as a way of making the economy more dynamic, believing 
that it would be a betrayal of the Party's internationalist beliefs for Britain 
to remain o u t s i d e . I f this was an organisation, composed primarily of 
Gaitskell 's own supporters, why then did he not join them on Europe? 
The answer was that he realised the need to achieve unity a year before 
an Election, and not least so to maintain his own position. 
Labour also tabled a Commons motion in August 1961 noting that Britain 
should only enter if the negotiated terms were acceptable to the 
Commonweal th and EFTA. Gaitskell 's careful opening speech was, as 
Duncan Sandys said winding up, 'a notable balancing act, ably stating the 
case on both sides.' To pro-Marketeers, it seemed that he was hedging 
bets around condit ions he knew would never be accepted. Yet ardent 
ant i-Marketeers felt he had sold out to those who would betray national 
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sovereignty. And with the 1961 Annual Conference accepting the 
leadership's l ine,"^ it was agreed to continue play a 'waiting game'. 
Gaitskell told a party meeting in December that the waiting attitude was 
right stating 'I do not want another internal party row about this.'^^° He 
further sought to reduce the tension by discouraging rival groups from 
submitt ing motions and by persuading the PLP that a vote on the issue 
might put him at a disadvantage against Macmil lan. Gaitskell had learned 
to t ime his moves cautiously with the lessons of 1960 having 'left their 
mark.'^^^ Therefore, with opinion polls showing a drop in support for entry 
and with the fate of the negotiations becoming tied to that of the 
Government,^^^ he alluded to the possibility of calling an election on the 
issue. Not only would it have been electorally unwise to endorse what 
was believed to be a major platform of a weak Government, with an 
election approaching Party activists would also expect him to attack the 
Government on all issues - including Europe.^^^ 
A second variable of Gaitskell 's party management concerned the 
manoeuvr ing of other senior party men. Jenkins had left the front bench 
in order to speak in favour of entry, and Wilson's scepticism over entry 
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was wel l known, the Shadow Chancellor commenting that Britain was not 
entit led to sell our 'kinsmen down the river for a problematical and 
marginal advantage in selling washing machines in Dusseldorf.'^^"* Indeed, 
having chal lenged for the leadership by Wilson in 1960, Gaitskell no doubt 
felt that neither he nor the Party could afford the risk of criticism that 
another Wi lson chal lenge would imply. So long as Europe maintained a 
low sal ience, Gaitskell would be politically secure. There was an 
indication, however, during 1962 that entry might yet become electorally 
signif icance, and he would have felt that, in terms of strengthening his 
leadership, he was obliged to adopt an equally strong opposing position. 
Meet ings with foreign politicians in the autumn provided the opportunity. 
III. Gai tskel i 's Anti-Market Move 
On two occasions in 1962 Gaitskell appeared to be taking a more critical 
European line. On one occasion he told a meeting in New York that a 
Europe with high external tariffs might harm the NATO alliance - both in its 
cohesion and in its relations with the 'Third W o r l d ' . T h e second 
occasion was a private dinner hosted by Jenkins that also included Jean 
Monnet, the founder of the original European Coal and Steel Community. 
Whi le Monnet tried to dispel Gaitskell 's doubts, the Labour leader felt that 
if Monnet could not put up a better case than just saying 'one must have 
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f a i t h ' , t h e n the balance had to be tilted against entry.^^^ In public, 
however, he continued giving no commitment, contriving to sound 
sympathet ic to both sides. Once the terms were announced, however, we 
see this position beginning to change. Gaitskell, angered by the 
seemingly poor economic arguments being put fonA/ard, became 
convinced that the problem was the Common Agricultural Policy,^^° 
arguing that this was protectionism for European agriculture. For him, the 
protection of the Commonweal th was paramount. He also thought it was 
unacceptable that the Common Market had been given so much 
consti tut ional powers under the Rome T r e a t y . H e was worried, 
however, that anti-Marketeers would exploit any criticisms he might make. 
So whi le we clearly see his concerns over the terms negotiated, we also 
see an anxiety to that an aggressive anti Market response might 
unbalance the unity. The private clash with Monnet also had a public 
echo in a bitter exchange with the Belgian Prime Minister Henri Spaak,^^° 
with Gaitskell rejecting Spaak's federalist views on both constitutional and 
Commonweal th g r o u n d s . I n contrast, a meeting with Commonwealth 
socialist leaders in September 1962 was marked by harmony and 
responsiveness, with it becoming clear that entry would damage 
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Commonweal th unity itself.'^^^ The policy reversal was, therefore, 
beginning to take shape. In a party political broadcast in September 1962 
Gaitskell argued that whi le membership would make it easier to sell within 
Common Market states, a loss of any trading advantages would make it 
harder to sell to either the rest of Europe or C o m m o n w e a l t h . H e also 
bel ieved that any future federal super-state would spur 'the end of a 
thousand years of history.'^^"^ He knew he had the opportunity for 
reconcil iation with the Labour Left by manufacturing some sort of anti-
Market line. As far as the pro-Marketeers were concerned, again the 
need to create an internal consensus to achieve Party unity seems 
paramount.^^^ So we can see the concerns of party dynamics, the 
chance of gaining Labour Left a p p r o v a l , w e r e of greater importance 
than the concerns of the national issue of entry itself, as events at the 
1962 Conference were to prove. 
IV. Discovering A New Unity 
Gaitskell 's new determination was evident a week before the Conference 
when , at a meet ing of the Shadow Cabinet, he displayed a very tough line 
with his old allies on the Labour Right. The finalise NEC document. 
132 The Times 21.9.1962 
133 Brivati B. op cit. p.410 
134 The Railway Review 5.10.1962. 
135 Williams P.M. op cit. pp. 731-732 
136 Tribune 14.9.1962. 
46 
Labour and the Common Market, argued that if entry allowed Britain to 
mobil ise Europe's economies to promote world peace then the case for 
entry would be strong, if it weakened Commonwealth trade then the case 
against entry would be decisive. It concluded that the issue was always a 
matter of b a l a n c e . A s Gaitskell prepared for Conference, agnosticism 
mingled with political calculation: his faith in the Commonwealth and belief 
in Britain's global role conflicted with both his loyalty to his old Labour 
Right supporters and an instinct that a British bid would almost certainly 
fail.^^^ In beginning his address, Gaitskell posed three questions. Was the 
Common Market an aggressive one? Was it damaging to others? And 
what exactly was involved in the concept of political union? Apart from the 
customs aspects, he argued that a fully developed Common Market might 
mean a federal Europe with national governments being handed over 
instead to a centralised European S u p e r - S t a t e . T h i s would result, he 
thought, in Britain being no more than a state in the United States of 
Europe and also mean the abandonment of the Commonwealth. 'We do 
not propose to forget Vimy Ridge and Gallipoli.'^'*° The speech's effect on 
the audience was devastating^"^^ and gained an ovation that was 
unparalleled,^"*^ with Jay believing it to have been 'an intellectual 
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massacre.'^''^ Michael Foot was delighted to see Labour taking clear 
opposit ion to the Tories on a major issue.^"*"^ And when Frank Cousins 
indicated wil l ingness to f inance the printing of the speech, it seemed as if 
the wounds caused by previous divisions were beginning to heal.^"*^ It was 
of great advantage to Gaitskell to end the rift with the Labour movement 's 
most powerful trade unionist.^"^® 
His speech unified private passion and public vision,^'^^ with Gaitskell 
mastering his private capacity for emotion and moulding it into a political 
weapon which 'left his political opponents and friends floundering in his 
wake ' . It was t imed perfectly, with its message unifying the party. Labour 
Right pro-Marketeers were not impressed,^"^^ but were effectively t ied to 
Gaitskell by the prospect of a Labour Government and by threads of 
loyalty that even the Conference speech could not sever. Unlike those on 
the Labour Left, they could not threaten Gaitskell with future trouble for in 
many ways they must have felt their position within the party depended 
upon his leadership.^"^^ The speech delighted those who believed a united 
party could more effectively take on the Tories and silenced those who 
remained opposed to Gaitskell but had been denied grounds for 
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continuing the assault. It was also a policy that had popular potential and, 
if his hunch proved correct, the political cost would be zero as the French 
were about to reject the British bid anyway.^^° As for Gaitskell himself, 
following the battles over Clause IV and d e f e n c e , h e was determined to 
avoid the same thing happening again over Europe. 
The experience of the leadership in formulating European policy cannot 
be divorced from experiences in other fields of policy making. The 
contextual situation of this debate was not one that suddenly materialised, 
but was made up from a web of shared past experiences.'^^^ Helped by 
the fact that Europe was not something he felt passionate about, Gaitskell 
was able to see the pragmatic benefits of adopting a decidedly anti-Market 
stance. In this sense Gaitskell's behaviour is completely consistent with 
the view expressed here, that Labour leaders in opposition see the 
maintenance of party unity as their first priority. Indeed, after the 
Conference he urged leading pro-Market union leaders to concentrate 
instead on pressing the Government to gain better terms for entry. From 
Gaitskell's viewpoint, the pro-Marketeers insistence on emphasising 
improved conditions of entry would weaken their case for rebelling when 
the debate over the principle of entry finally came. His advice to them 
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would protect them now but would neutralise them later - both to his 
advantage. Within the Party as a whole, he exploited the opportunity 
given by his speech to consolidate its unity and, by consequence, his own 
leadership position as well.^^^ For the first time he had won the total 
approval of the 'left wing' constituencies in 'talking their kind of language'. 
Gaitskell's siding with the Labour Left on a major policy issue established 
him, in their eyes, as something more than ' a tool of a handful of 
revisionist intellectuals.'^^'' By opposing his own 'natural' constituency, he 
avoided any fresh divisions that might jeopardise Labour's electoral 
p r o s p e c t s . L e a v i n g Ellison to conclude that 'By the end of 1962 Labour 
seemed on the verge of new found unity.'^ ^® 
The issue of entry was part of the on-going party political discourse, both 
inside the Party and between government and opposition. Gaitskell partly 
accepted the view that it was a matter that transcended party politics, but 
only partly as it was clearly also a matter on which he could unite the party 
in opposition to the Conservative Government. Secondly, his approach 
was at best grudging, and at worst agnostic as the key passage in his 
Brighton speech was a series of 'ifs': for example, if the Commonwealth 
could be safeguarded, if the EFTA countries could be brought in and 
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implicitly if it could be an inter - governmental organisation. By the same 
token his objection was based not on the principle of entry but on the 
particular terms secured. It was, therefore, a political choice, made to 
unite the party midway through a Parliament against a government that 
was in trouble and had staked much of its reputation on gaining entry.^^^ 
Indeed, by the end of 1962 Gaitskell's position was apparently strong with 
the Party well ahead in the polls. A new domestic programme also began 
to emerge, combining social egalitarianism with planning, and a public 
relations campaign launched to improve Labour's image among the 
aspiring c l a s s e s . T h e r e were real hopes, therefore, that a Labour 
Government under Gaitskell might follow the next e l e c t i o n . A t 56 he 
was at the height of his powers. The long and bitter struggles were now 
over, with many both inside the Party and out, seeing him as a future 
Prime Minister in w a i t i n g . H e was not, however, to be the beneficiary of 
the Party's improving fortunes, dying from a rare blood disease in early 
1963.^'^ 
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4. Conclusions 
After battles over nationalisation and defence. Labour was now able to 
find unity as 'the Commonwealth' party. Had the Conservative 
Government's negotiations produced agreement, the party may well have 
split suffering yet another crisis. Thus Europe acted as a unifying agent, 
providing it did not develop into an issue demanding a clear choice. From 
de Gaulle's veto, Gaitskell calculated that the negotiations would fail and 
his subsequent behaviour can be interpreted as efforts to ensure that this 
would be the case and that Labour would garner any electoral benefits 
following from such a failure. He would have been aware that his 
references to the Atlantic Alliance would have provoked the French and of 
the significance his remarks would be given. Indeed it is possible to argue 
Gaitskell made it easier for the Six to oppose the Government's efforts 'as 
it appeared that half of Britain was solidly against entry.' In this sense, the 
failed application in 1962 was aided by the actions of Labour. Gaitskell's 
move from being uncommitted to 'emotional' opposition was in reality a 
tactical move to win internal party unity. He correctly calculated that his 
inconsistencies would not catch up with him since the issue was unlikely 
ever require a clear decision to be made. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
WILSON AND THE 
PUSH TOWARDS ENTRY 
1. Introduction 
Labour's European policy from 1964 to 1970 supported British entry into 
the Common Market. There was neither any real conversion to the ideal 
of European federalism, nor any abandonment of a British national identity 
or of ending the special relationship for that m a t t e r . T h e policy 
consensus only changed when London was forced to think of new ways of 
correcting its ailing economy. Wilson was now able to move to a position 
of support without any Cabinet resignations, through avoiding a debate on 
the principle - thus making it difficult for anti-Marketeers to respond. His 
position also prevented the pro-European Conservative leader, Edward 
Heath, from exploiting the situation. And if the negotiations did succeed 
he would then be able to take the full credit. Conversely if they failed he 
could not then be accused of not trying. In short, he was setting up a 
situation in which he could not lose.^^^ 
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It is essential to see how Britain's economic position played a part in 
defining Britain's 'world view'. Wilson gradually became constrained by 
foreign economic pressure so that by 1966 the imperatives to join became 
irresistible. Commonwealth trade had not provided the answer; the US 
seemed less friendly, with the new parliamentary intake more inclined 
towards a pro European path.^ ®"* So with this in mind, he set off on a path 
to gain both Cabinet and wider European support. At the same time, he 
was not prepared to allow this 'new idea' to harm Party unity. He devised, 
therefore, an alternative avenue should matters not move in the desired 
direction. 
2. The Economic Context 
The policy shift towards Europe centred around the held view^^^ that 
answers were needed to cure Britain's economic decline - a fact 
reinforced by Washington's support for a greater British European 
involvement. And since Britain relied on US nuclear armoury this was no 
small fact. By 1960, with economy decline and Commonwealth links 
w e a k e n i n g , B r i t a i n concluded to adopt a European role.^®^ Electoral 
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concerns still dominated Labour thinking at this point. By 1963 failure to 
enter the Common Market, economy decline. Cabinet sackings and 
Profumo Affair served to tarnish the image of the Conservative 
Government.^^® Wilson had also been able to unite a Party that had been 
deeply divided, with the NEC was conscious not to do anything which 
would 'undermine or embarrass it"^^^ Labour conveyed an image as both 
modern and united, with Wilson talking 'of the scientific r e v o l u t i o n ' . O n 
Europe, however, he failed to show any interest in reviving the issue 
before an election, lest it broke party unity.^^^ With the breakdown of the 
negotiations and onset of an election, there seemed no reason to go 
beyond the five conditions set by G a i t s k e l l . L i k e his predecessor, he too 
was not prepared to do anything that might upset this party unity nor those 
who had just voted into the l e a d e r s h i p . T h e political adage that 
'Oppositions don't win elections. Governments lose them' seems to have 
been at the forefront of his mind. 
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3. The Labour Government 1964 - 1966 
From 1964 and 1966 Britain still regarded itself as a potential global 
actor,^ ^"* Indeed, Wilson was strongly critical of those who 'warned that 
Britain's independent role on the world stage was "about played out.'^^^ 
Washington was not only eager to maintain the value of sterling as the 
first line of defence for the dollar; it also wanted Britain to maintain military 
commitments east of Suez. During 1965 Britain agreed to avoid 
devaluation and maintain forces east of Suez in return for financial support 
for sterling. This was done probably for two reasons. First, with only a 
small majority Wilson had to nurse the Government along until it seemed 
electorally opportune to seek a second election. Loans bought him that 
time.^^^ He also felt vulnerable to the jibes that through a policy of 
devaluing the Government could not be trusted to maintain Britain's global 
p o s i t i o n . P u r s u i n g such a policy before an election, he thought, would 
be a disaster. Second, there were sound economic reasons for not 
devaluing. Sterling's position as a reserve currency meant that the US did 
not want devaluation as this would mean making the dollar a front line 
currency, with the Bank of England believing that it could lead to a decline 
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in world t r a d e . T h i s meant that there were both pressures and the 
means by which not to devalue. Instead Wilson believed that sterling's 
overvaluation could be corrected by both increased productivity and 
effective prices and incomes policy. These aims were at the heart of the 
1965 National Plan, whose aim was to increase national output by a 
quarter between 1964 and 1970. However, the 'July measures' seemed 
to undermine the credibility of these t a r g e t s ; w h i l e at the same time 
reducing plan related government e x p e n d i t u r e . A l l this only served to 
further disillusion Wilson about the role of the C o m m o n w e a l t h . S o we 
now begin to see the first signs of the need to look towards Europe for 
economy prosperity. 
While a number of factors began to push Britain towards Europe in the 
same way as in 1961, the balance of the argument had shifted in two 
respects. Whereas the Conservative Government's had tried to ensure 
British exports had an equal footing in continental markets, by the mid 
1960s European Governments realised that high technology industries 
were going to depend on large markets and also large injections of 
government f u n d s . W i t h no single government being able to afford to 
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finance the projects, Europe would have to work more closely together^^^ if 
high technology was not to become a US monopoly. Second, with the 
Commonwealth in disarray and the US administration pre-occupied in 
Vietnam, Britain could gain greatly by being associated with Europe.^^'* 
During the 1966 Election campaign Wilson began to argue that Britain 
should make another bid for entry provided British and Commonwealth 
interests were safeguarded'.'^®^ By posing as a 'sceptic' during the 
campaign in contrast to the more enthusiastic H e a t h , h e was able to 
satisfy both the pro-and anti-Market lobbies. His position seems more 
designed for internal consumption than for the electorate. As Wilson said 
'Given a fair wind we will negotiate our way, head held high, not crawl 
in.'^°^ By making a 'fair wind' a condition, he was satisfying the anti-
Marketeers and by doubting the Conservatives commitment during the 
first bid he was keeping the pro-Marketeers happy as well.^ ®® So at this 
stage Labour's position was no different from that of Gaitskell's - the 
grounds for entry were equally balanced and the right terms would finally 
tilt the scales. Like Gaitskell before him, he was not suddenly going to opt 
for one position lest it upset internal party unity. Just as Gaitskell had 
shadowed the moves of Macmillan, so Wilson scrutinised Heath's actions 
for any attempt to gain partisan advantage. Two central issues, British 
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moves towards Europe and the need for Labour to maintain internal unity 
continued to work alongside each other. In the event. Labour was 
returned to office with a large majority, a Cabinet that was now more 
strongly pro-Market than before^®^ and thus in a position to carry out its 
commitments without too much worry. The central question was whether 
Labour would gain Common Market entry. 
4. The Labour Government 1966 -1970 
Shortly after the Election, a Cabinet working party was set up to re-
examine the whole issue of entry. This momentum increased following 
the July economic crisis. Brown failed to mobilise support for devaluation 
with a new de-flationary package imposed instead, with Wilson seemingly 
trapped into putting the status symbols of world power above those of 
economic regeneration. During 1967 his position further shifted, as not 
only was unemployment at its highest for a generation, the cost of further 
de-flationary measures seemed almost unbearable. So by finally 
devaluing the Government hoped to eliminate the need for further 
deflationary measures.^^° Treasury pressure, though, eventually forced 
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the withdrawal from east of Suez.^^^ This trimming heralded a more 
fundamental reorientation of priorities towards Europe.^^^ Britain now 
needed new economic and international connections to prevent it 
appearing ever less the US's partner and more its 'European factotum.' 
Hopes of increased Commonwealth trade had also proved unrealistic; 
ideas about developing Commonwealth political links had been frustrated 
by the African-attitudes over British policy in Rhodes ia .B i t te rness over 
Rhodesia helped diminish Britain's enthusiasm for the Commonwealth.^^'^ 
Yet if Britain could no longer exert influence in the Commonwealth, then 
the historic role as the main US ally was in jeopardy. The whole crisis was 
not lost on Wilson. There could be no question of coming down on one 
side of the argument and dismissing the other. While his own 
reservations after the 'July crisis' were no longer so s t r o n g , h e still had 
to take into account sharp internal divisions. He continued, therefore, to 
remain cautious at a weekend Cabinet meeting in October 1966 by 
suggesting a series of visits to the six member states. While Wilson made 
every effort ton suggest he was anti-Market Barbara Castle was certain 
that he had already 'sold out' to the supporters of e n t r y . Y e t while the 
pro-Marketeers could count this as a step forward, they were still 
suspicious that the whole exercise was just some 'Wilsonian' ploy to show 
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that entry could not succeed.Never the less , in November 1967, Wilson 
and Brown did embark on their tour of the European capitals. 
While both the Italians and Germans were supportive,^ ®® the French 
seemed disturbed by Wilson's exposition of Britain's problems^®® regarding 
the US still as 'Britain's place'. Yet with de Gaulle still sufficiently non-
committal,^°° there can be no doubt that Wilson returned to London a more 
committed advocate of entry.^°^ And in obtaining Cabinet support in April, 
he succeeded in guiding discussions onto matters of the detail which, as 
Castle noted, was 'more effective than anything else in making principles 
look less important.'^°^ Anti-Marketeers like Castle and Healey were 
convinced that whatever the British tried to do, France would certainly 
veto any application. Wilson's main problem, however, was to get 
agreement without any resignations. Convinced that a delay would 
exacerbate existing differences, he wanted a swift decision to be taken 
after the latest round' of world trade talks. The success of his tactics can 
be shown when the policy was unanimously supported.^""* Wilson clearly 
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wished to explore the same possibilities as Macmillan had done before, 
whilst also avoiding any impression of bi-partisanship. When the issue 
reached Parliament, Brown reiterated the themes surrounding Britains 
position in the world whilst promising to safeguard Commonwealth 
interests^°^ A three-line whip was imposed for the final vote with the 
Government winning a majority of 426. How far then can this be 
understood in terms of the variables of party management? 
Labour's approach to Europe was marked by a number of policies, each 
with an ambiguity that represented a deliberate effort to avoid specific 
goals. Its policy consisted of negative, neutral and positive strands 
intenA/oven into one ambiguous approach that served to absorb tensions 
and thus minimise conflict. While in opposition it had plans to remedy 
Britain's misfortunes at home and abroad, in office the Commonwealth 
alternative failed to develop and a serious balance of payments' problem 
had frustrated the National Plan. Labour was experiencing the realities of 
Government, with entry providing an alternative role for Britain both 
politically and economically. When faced with a situation demanding 
decisions, the Government defined the national interest and acted in a 
totally different manner to its time in opposition. To a greater extent 
Labour was successful in disguising new policy goals by presenting them 
to the party as mere reinterpretations of orthodox goals. Its success could 
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be explained by the fact that leading anti-Marketeers were inside the 
Cabinet and so were in a difficult position to openly criticise policy.^"® 
With growing discontent on defence, the Incomes Policy and Vietnam 
War, Wilson was also concerned at presenting yet another controversial 
issue - the Common Market - on an already volatile PLP. 
Wilson using two devices subdued both the Cabinet and PLP. The first 
involved the re-imposition of stricter discipline. In March 1967 Wilson 
delivered his 'dog licence' speech to the party, giving a warning to 
potential rebels that-"every dog is allowed one bite, but if biting becomes 
too much a habit its owner tends to have doubts about renewing the 
licence when it comes up"^"'' The second device concerned the way in 
which the actual Cabinet decision taken. No collective decision was ever 
taken on entry,^°^ with all shades of opinion being allowed to believe that 
their view held sway. Even so, Wilson still knew that the key to entry lay in 
Paris. When he returned to Paris in June he found de Gaulle in a gloomy 
mood, pre-occupied by UK subservience to Washington and convinced 
that an enlarged Europe would follow the same course. So while Wilson 
assured the Cabinet upon his return that his visit had made entry more 
likely,^°^ some did not find his arguments convincing.^^° Their scepticism 
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was justified as in November 1967 when de Gaulle vetoed British entry. 
As Stewart noted 'If applying to join the Common Market was a game of 
snakes and ladders, Britain was once again back at square one.'^^^ It now 
seemed clear that there would be no real progress until de Gaulle left 
o f f i c e . T h o u g h Wilson had chosen temporarily to espouse the Common 
Market, he did not feel himself committed to any such liaison if the 
balance of advantage suddenly switched. So while this decision was a set 
back, there were also some minor political benefits to be gleaned. The 
pro-Marketeers were satisfied that Wilson had shown himself to be serious 
about entry, while the anti- Marketeers felt their position had been 
vindicated.^^^ 
Three basic European policies, therefore, emerged from the tour of 
Europe, as well as Cabinet and PLP discussions. There was 
disagreement not only over matters of degree and emphasis but also over 
policy direction, since two of the policies were seemingly contradictory. 
The first strand took the form of positive support for entry; the second of 
restrained support and the final strand opposed entry outright. They only 
subscribed to the application because they intended to reject whatever 
terms became available, believing that the Cabinet, PLP and electorate 
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would arrive at the same view too. These contradictions did not open up 
into conflict during 1966 and 1967, as entry looked increasingly unlikely. 
However, with De Gaulle retirement in 1969, the way now seemed clear 
for a fresh British bid.^ "^* De Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou, gave 
early indications that he was not against British entry in principle. Indeed, 
at a Common Market summit conference in 1969 it was agreed that 
negotiations for British entry should begin by 1970.^ ^^ Wilson still 
concluded that entry should be supported so long as 'acceptable terms for 
Britain'^ ^^ could be produced. Publicly he continued to contrast his own 
strategy of negotiation only on the right terms, with Heaths supposed 
readiness to enter on any terms.^ ^^ While Labour's 1970 election 
manifesto emphasised that British and Commonwealth interests needed 
to be safeguarded, it did assert that the forthcoming negotiations would be 
'pressed with determination.'^^° Again electoral dynamics were in play. By 
not proposing any radical ideas, he was unlikely to offend a sufficiently 
large electoral base and thus make the issue of Common Market entry a 
largely non-partisan matter. 
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7. Conclusions 
The European policy consensus until the late 1950s consisted of Britain 
viewing itself as a world power, seeing its interests lying with the US, the 
Commonwealth and to a lesser extent with Europe. However, as Britain 
moved into the 1960s, the declining position of the economy necessitated 
a policy shift, with both the Commonwealth and US seemingly only 
exacerbating the situation. Britain now looked to the Common Market as 
the solution to its economic problems. In assessing the relationship of the 
two Wilson Governments we needs to clarify a number of points. First, we 
have shown that it was able to achieve a certain degree of internal unity 
over entry. Perhaps then the issue of maintaining party unity is a question 
of balance? When in Opposition the balance between the policy and party 
management shifts towards the latter because it will lack of the constraints 
of being in office and will have more flexibility in how it conducts policy, in 
Government, however, the balance shifts the other way as the 
Government party has a responsibility to initiate legislation. Yet the issue 
of party unity is still pertinent, as a Government that is disunited will find it 
much harder to implement its policy commitments than an administration 
that has some degree of unity. However, as we shall see, from the early 
1970's there began a growing disenchantment about the manner in which 
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Labour seemed to be abusing the party machinery - most notable that of 
annual conference.^ ^® 
While Wilson moved from criticism of Macmillan's bid, to masterminding a 
rush to apply, it is a little more difficult to pin down his motives for doing 
so. Even some Cabinet members seemed unable to decipher what they 
were. However, Wilson's method of handling the issue suggests that he 
did genuinely want to obtain entry. And perhaps it was a measure of his 
political skills that he was able to obtain such a decision without a single 
Cabinet resignation. By only ever addressing issues of detail, he was able 
to guide the Cabinet, PLP and wider Party along a direction he knew they 
would find difficulty from reversing from.^ ^° Aware that the French would 
use their veto, why then why did he press so strongly for entry? While the 
actual process of negotiation gave him plenty of opportunities to indulge in 
personal diplomacy with its attendant publicity, the main reason was that 
he realised there was nothing to lose from making an application. As with 
previous governments, he too needed a policy that might provide a new 
opportunity to break out from successive economic policy failures. He 
also knew that Heath was strongly pro-European and would want to make 
this an issue in a General Election. Wilson's tactics served a dual 
purpose - if negotiations succeeded he could claim the credit, if they failed 
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no one could accuse him of not t ry ing.A l though the negotiations did 
fail, he achieved his object of making the EEC a largely bi-partisan issue 
and not a matter of controversy in 1970.^ ^^ 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
WILSON AND THE 
NEEDS OF OPPOSITION 
1. Introduction 
The Labour Party in 1970 was both in Parliament and In the 
constituencies committed to Common Market entry. Had Wilson won the 
1970 election he would have pursued entry, with the pro-Marketeer, Roy 
Jenkins, leading negotiations.^^^ However, Labour unexpectedly lost the 
election and Wilson, while in favour of entry, needed to discredit Heath's 
contribution to the European debate. He wanted Britain to enter Europe 
with a united Party accepting the decision. If this did not work then he 
wanted Britain out of Europe but with a united Party. Wilson pursued this 
strategy with skill and tenacity,^ "^* staving off the Party's 'own bankruptcy 
and decline.'^^^ However, between June 1970 and 1972 the Party was, 
while never rejecting entry outright, still opposed to entry.^ ^® With factions 
competing for recognition, Wilson strove to forge unity, through the 
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combination of a compromise policy, disciplinary measures, voting pact, 
and finally a referendum. In contrast to the 1960s, Britain was now in a 
stronger economic position to pursue entry with sterling having improved 
since devaluation. Heath's 'Europeanism' had distanced Britain from the 
US, with few seeing the Commonwealth as a barrier to entry. Heath 
introduced his White Paper, citing arguments used in 1967, that entry 
would improve economic performance with no loss of sovereignty.Yet 
with sixty Conservative anti-Marketeers, Heath was concerned that Labour 
could defeat his plans.^ ^^ We need to show how Wilson retreated from a 
more pro-Market position whilst still attempting to placate the anti-Market 
lobby. We will see how his efforts came to nothing - a major contributing 
factor being Labour's move to the left. We see how the European debate 
became a 'pawn' in the battles between the Labour Left and the Labour 
Right, with Wilson proposing a referendum in order to ease party tensions. 
We conclude that the fact Labour had not terminally split was due to his 
efforts in party management. 
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2 . Labour And The Common Market 
I) The Four Different Strands 
The gulf within Labour over Europe became so wide that it looked as if 
permanent damage would accrue with opinion splitting four ways. First, 
there were the pro-Marketeers that were prepared to vote for entry almost 
on any terms. By this time pro-Market MPs were almost entirely on the 
Labour Right under the leadership of Roy Jenkins. The group was bound 
together by agreement over a Keynesian agenda as well as support for 
Common Market entry.^ ^^ The group furthest removed from the pro-
Marketeers was the Labour Left, organised in Parliament by the Tribune 
Group. Their philosophy was state socialism with their strength lying 
largely in the trade unions. However, if the Labour Left were all anti-
Marketeers, by no means all anti-Marketeers were of the Labour Left. So 
a third group emerged, with their presence (they accounted for over half 
the PLP and probably over half the Party as a whole) affording the Labour 
Left the opportunity to claim that the issue of Europe was not just another 
Left versus Right struggle. A fourth group was made up of MPs who may 
have been either mildly in favour or, mildly against entry, but were chiefly 
concerned with maintaining party unity.^ ^° These were most prone to 
follow a pro-Market lead of a Labour Government, most prone to be 
hostile if in Opposition. They were to be crucial in holding the balance of 
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power in the Party, and most notable among its members were Wilson 
and Callaghan. 
However, it's one thing to identify these groups, but its quite another to 
explain why they held the views they did. Left leaning anti-Marketeers, 
saw the Six as a 'capitalist club.' Labour Right anti-Marketeers were more 
swayed on constitutional issues, believing the thought of foreigners 
making decisions affecting Britain was abhorrent. They often had close 
ties with the Commonwealth and the US. For many, 'Mannheim and Milan 
were much further away than Delhi or even Des Moines.'^ ^^ So while anti-
Marketeers resisted change, pro-Marketeers not surprisingly accepted it. 
They supported the mixed economy, the division of Europe, and the fact 
of Britain's economic decline, believing that outside Europe this decline 
would only accelerate. The divisions were thus not just divisions over 
policy, they were also divisions over ideology. It was not certain whether 
Labour could survive these divisions.^^^ 
II) The Beginnings Of Wilson's Repositioning 
Soon after Parliament reassembled following the 1970 General Election, 
the trade unions began to take a much clearer anti-Market line. With 
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Annual Conference shortly to meet, the NEC felt that the most it could 
realistically obtain was a reaffirmation of the cautious pro-Market decision 
taken the previous year. And while they narrowly won the vote, anti-
Marketeers soon began to recover further ground.^ ^^ The Party was, 
therefore, heading for a difficult summer.^ "^* With this trend continuing, it 
was reasonable to expect that Labour would take a strongly anti-Market 
line. In such an event the Shadow Cabinet would be in a much-weakened 
position, not only because of the election defeat and the but because the 
power of Conference had increased substantially as well.^ ^^ Wilson was 
not a pro-European by instinct,^ ^^ deeply regretting Britain's decline as a 
world power. 'He was not at all happy to have climbed to the top of the 
greasy pole only to discover that it no longer afforded a view as it once 
had done.'^^'' While he prided himself on being able to construct 
compromises, Europe was not proving to be an issue upon which a 
suitable solution to could be found. He was also facing growing internal 
disillusionment over Labour's record in office,^ ^^ as well as mounting PLP 
criticism over his own Commons performance. The difficulty for him was 
that it seemed increasingly likely that Heath was going to be offered terms 
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acceptable to the Tories, but which the Party looked like dividing on. The 
question was how could Wilson resolve this dilemma? And though Benn's 
idea of a referendum was scotched as early as November 1970, it was not 
forgotten. With Labour becoming deeply divided, the idea was later to 
gain momentum.^ ^® 
If a split occurs when a party is in opposition it is usually less dangerous. 
A split can be avoided when the parties 'agree to disagree' and a balance 
exists between competing factions. If one emerges as victorious the 
leaders of the other groups may have to resign with party unity thereby 
threatened. In order not to drive the pro-Marketeers into a corner and 
force a split, the NEC decided that a forthcoming Special Conference on 
the subject should offer no opinion. The decision also shows that 
although the Conference's resolutions were not binding on the PLP, the 
Conference was nevertheless strong enough to make Wilson anxious to 
avoid a Conference decision.^ "^ ^ The debate was a vigorous one with pro-
Marketeers reminding delegates that the economic failings necessitated 
British entry^ "*^  with anti Marketeers suggesting that the terms were 
appalling.^ "*^ Though wanted the debate to continue until Annual 
Conference, Wilson was soon to make up his mind with the NEC passing 
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a resolution invited the PLP 'to unite wholeheartedly in voting against the 
government's policy.'^ '^ ^ And with Annual Conference ovenA^helmingly 
passing this recommendation, the issue of party unity now came into the 
open. On the night of the result many pro-Marketeers let it be known that 
they would vote with Heath in the Commons. It was in such 
circumstances that Wilson gave his annual address, indicating that a 
rebellion would be tolerated providing all dissenters rejoined the fold to 
vote on all consequential legislation. He could not imagine a single 
Labour MP who will not be in the lobbies against the Government.'^ '*'' In 
other words, a pact seemed to be on offer. What factors lay behind this? 
Wilson had to ensure that no one could usurp his position. Not only would 
such a posture help him achieve this, it might also appeal successfully to 
both lobbies in exercising a level of restraint. While under different 
circumstances, he might have been tempted to join the anti-Market lobby, 
that option was not open. Had he done so he would have been as having 
changed his view for no other purpose than to save his leadership. His 
political credibility would have been destroyed. He also knew that, 
however much he disliked the prospect, Britain's future lay within Europe. 
And with pro-Marketeers including some of the Party's most respected 
politicians, he recognised that if they were somehow driven out, Labour's 
electoral standing would have declined. So in attempting to ensure the 
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pro-Marketeers plight was not rendered intolerable, his appeals for unity, 
while including an anti-Market theme, were also a restatement of a 
positive European commitment. There can be little doubt that in private 
he warned the anti -Marketeers of what the consequences would be if 
they tried to force the Party into opposing entry in principle.^ "^ ^ He was 
playing for time. If matters were forced to a head, the anti-Marketeers 
would win with Labour most probably splitting. Matters had to remain 
hypothetical. Out of office the task was not government decisions but 
forms of words - conference resolutions and NEC statements. And he 
was not going to take mere words seriously. After all, it might be years 
before a Labour Government was returned to power. Why tear the Party 
apart now over something it certainly could not control? 
Ill) Labour Disunity And Tiie iVIove To Tiie Left 
By offering a hint of a pact,^ "*^  Wilson was presenting pro-Marketeers with 
a dilemma. How could self-proclaimed 'men of principle' vote against 
measures without which entry would be impossible? Yet how could they 
vote for them repeatedly without isolating themselves from the party? 
However, Jenkins continuing to repeat that the terms were satisfactory 
largely halted this tactic. In response, anti-Marketeers challenged Jenkins 
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to be honest 'enough to admit that, as far as they are concerned, the 
terms have never mattered.'^ '^ ^ In a sense, the attack revealed the 
inherent contradiction in Labour's approach to Europe: when the time 
arrived for a decision the pro-Marketeers were as disposed towards 
finding the terms acceptable as the anti-Marketeers were disposed 
towards viewing them unacceptable. 
With Heath experiencing internal problems of his own, he astutely offered 
his Party a free vote, calculating that Labour pro-Marketeers would cancel 
out any Tory defections and thus provide him with a majority. What would 
Wilson do? Would he also offer a free vote? This was important to the 
'Jenkinsites', who would be in danger of victimisation if they defied the 
whip, than if a whip was not imposed. While Wilson had signalled that if 
the Party opposed entry, the pro-Marketeers would be able to vote for it, 
party opinion in the country was now making this option less attractive. 
Jenkins claims Wilson deliberately broke the 'pact' by calling a three-line 
whip, and by holding a Shadow Cabinet meeting at such short notice that 
Jenkins could not attend to register his dissent.^ "*^  So a whip was imposed 
with sixty-nine Labour MPs joining the Government, producing a 
Commons majority of 112.^ "*^  The Labour rebellion was of a scale 
unprecedented in its history. Jenkins' influence proved to be crucial. 
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There is little doubt that most pro-Market Labour MPs would have 
abstained on his instruction. Indeed, Crosland argued that a stand could 
be made without voting with Heath, believing that in the long run it might 
damage both Jenkins and the Party. Jenkins believed that was nothing to 
the damage Crosland was doing to himself by his 'indecisiveness'^^° They 
could rebel once, however, but they could not safely go on rebelling. In 
the passage of the consequential legislation, most rebels joined the 
opposition lobbies. In defying the whip, however, many 'rebels' had put 
their careers at risk - the Labour MP, Dick Taverne, was ousted by his 
CLP as a direct result. So the rebellion could have been even greater but 
for the deterrent of deselection, for in the loyalist 'culture of the Labour 
Party there could be few graver misdemeanours.'^" Disunity could not be 
disguised.^^^ The Labour Left complained about the rebels' behaviour,^ "^* 
with Castle talking of 'this treachery causing immense bitterness.'^ ^^ So 
perhaps the word 'rebellion' is too weak a word for what took place during 
the vote. This was tantamount to 'civil war'. Wilson's 'pact' had clearly 
failed, with the Party continuing to adopt policies that it had previously 
striven to avoid. This slide from Europe considerably embarrassed Wilson 
who was at pains to claim that he had not shifted his position. He devoted 
five minutes of his speech to the 1971 Special Conference in refuting the 
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charge that the Party had been inconsistent on Europe. Why then was 
there an anti-Market shift? 
A large question mark evidently hangs over how precipitous Labour's shift 
from Europe really was. There had always been a great deal of 
opposition to Europe. Indeed it was significant that the 1967 Conference, 
while endorsing the Labour Government's European initiative, also cast 
more than 2,500, 000 votes for a motion which, had it been passed, would 
have sought to impose on the Government a quite intolerable anti-market 
pos i t ion.Wi lson 's success in 'carrying his Party for Europe' in 1967 
owed much to the fact that Labour was in power and that entry was still 
hypothetical. De Gaulle was still in power and negotiations had not yet 
begun. A Labour MP in 1967 could quite consistently vote in favour of an 
application being made, while at the same time reserve his position with 
regard to the final outcome. By late 1971, however, all that had changed. 
Labour was in Opposition and the terms of the Treaty were now known. 
Moreover, the Heath Government was proving more unpopular than any 
previous Conservative administration since the 1930s, introducing 
measures that deeply offended the sensibilities of Labour supporters. It 
was going to be extremely difficult for the Labour movement, opposed to 
Heath on everything else, to suddenly offer support Europe. Pro-
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Marketeers were placed in a particularly difficult position because if they 
supported Heath they would be regarded as traitors. Their position was 
made no easier by the fact that Heath had a small majority and so could 
face defeat at any time - thus exposing the 'treachery' and the part played 
by the 'Jenkinsites'. Small wonder that pro-Market sentiment lost ground 
in the Party. Indeed, their position had reached a crisis, with many 
wanting to widen the issue to the future of social democracy against what 
they saw as the growing tide of leftism.^ ^® 
Disillusionment with the Wilson Governments,^^^ especially over the 
incomes policy and 'In Place of Strife' was a main cause of rank and file 
militancy.^ ®" By the early 1970's this had become even more acute.^ ^^ 
The slowdown in economic growth in the late 1960s had resulted in a new 
kind of union militancy which increasingly by-passed the national union 
leadership to arrive at higher wage settlements while at the same time 
change union voting patterns at annual, conference. It is significant that 
this period also saw the leaderships of two of the largest unions, the 
TGWU and AUEW, now being led by recognised members of the left.^ ^^ 
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It also changed the basis of the relationship between the working class 
and the Labour Party. Attachment to Labour was no longer based on 
traditional working class culture, but on a rational calculation of their 
collective interests. One journal argued that a successful partnership 
between the Party and the unions would only be possible if there were 'no 
more serious ruptures' between them The feeling that the poor 
performances of many of those in the last Labour Cabinet^ ®"* as well as the 
Conservatives apparent shift towards 'a more market based doctrine'^ ®^ 
showed how a greater union say in party policy-making was now needed. 
In stark contrast to the past, Conference decisions after the 1970 defeat 
now had a more visible impact on party policy,^ ^® Policy committees were 
up graded,^ ®^ with the dominant impulse being leftward, both in terms of 
policy terms,^ ^® and in terms of ensuring that in future elections the 
leadership would be bound to policies reflecting the concerns of ordinary 
members.^ ®^ Only on this basis could their compliance in any incomes 
policy be secured by a future Labour Government. Labour's Programme 
for Britain: 1972 signalled the erosion of the Labour Right's 'hegemony 
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over the formulation of party policy.'^ ^° The policy-making process was 
now more politicised, reflecting the shifting balance of power.^ ^^  With pro-
Marketeers now looking ideologically out of place. The old Labour Left 
from the NEC, was represented by Bevanites like Mikardo and Hart whose 
status and credibility in the policy sub-committees was enhanced in the 
new left-wing climate. From the PLP came MPs associated with the 
Labour Left like Castle, Foot and the Labour Left's most celebrated figure 
- Tony Benn who believed that the policies of the last Government had 
proved a failure.^^^ The once youthful technocrat and pro-European,^^^ of 
the first Wilson era, was 'now a born again socialist radicalised by his 
experience of workers in struggle.'^ "^^  So while it would be incorrect to say 
that they were now the dominant players in the party structures^^^ the 
balance had inextricably been turned. 
Doctrinal disagreement exacerbated by personal rivalry between the 
leading figures of the post Gaitskell generation, Jenkins and Crosland,^ ^® 
ensured that, instead of focusing efforts on refashioning Keynesian 
socialism,^^^ the Labour Right remained in 'total disarray' until the late 
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1970's.^ ^® Europe had reinforced the personal and intellectual divisions 
between both Jenkins and Crosiand that had developed during the 
1960's.^^^ Jenkins felt Crosland's to be 'less than firm' on Europe,'^ ^° with 
Crosiand irritated by attempts to suggest his attitudes were to do with 
opportunism than anxiety about party unity - he had abstained on the 
October vote. This had not endeared him to pro-Marketeers, and his 
decision to stand for Deputy leader resulted in the Jenkinsites voting for 
Short and so ensuring his defeat. 
And efforts to repair the rift between the two men proved to no avail^ ^^ as 
Jenkins' resignation as Deputy Leader over the Party's decision to hold a 
referendum prove terminal for hopes of revitalising the Labour Right. It 
meant that Jenkins was cut off from policy-making at a time when the 
'Bennites' were consolidating their position. It was partly the result of the 
Party's move to the Left and partly Labour's concentration on the issue of 
Europe that resulted in the Labour Right gaining little ground.^ ®^ Jenkins 
resignation also encouraged his allies to follow suit - so collectively 
depriving them of direct influence as well. The Labour Right pressure 
group 'Campaign for Labour Victory' became increasingly divided over its 
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aims, programme and leadership.^^^ The general lack of organisational 
work was widespread. Indeed another Labour Right ginger group, the 
Campaign for Democratic Socialism, was unable to sustain an active base 
in the constituencies that could have counterbalanced any leftward rise.^ "^^  
Right up to the late 1970's their inability to tackle this issue only served to 
exacerbate the problem. This fragmentation meant the Labour Left was 
able to make the running in a way that had not been possible before. And 
we need to remember that the Party's management style also allowed for 
a much more lenient approach to be taken to left leaning ginger groups 
that had previously been prescribed. The left could now call upon new 
sections in future political battles.^^^ Labour's slide from Europe was thus 
part of a slide towards more the left and from which the Labour Right did 
not recover for over a decade.^ ^^ Some doubted whether Labour could 
win an election in such a position.^^^ 
By failing to give a strong enough lead, Wilson was now saddled with a 
policy in which he had little faith and which permitted Labour Left activities 
to go unchecked. Could he have prevented any slide from Europe if he 
had really wanted to? It is just possible that he could have. But it is 
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certainly doubtful whether any strategy could have actually prevented a 
strong anti-Market line being adopted. In any case, his preference for 
playing a waiting game ultimately proved successful in terms of recovering 
party unity. He also knew that Britain's future lay in Europe and would not 
have wanted a future Labour Government tied to a policy of withdrawal. 
He also seemed to have overlooked the idea that the final decision on 
Europe might be shifted out of the party completely and placed in the 
hands of the electorate. From the spring of 1972 onwards, the question of 
the referendum, up to now only briefly mentioned, and the question of 
Labour's European policy were intertwined. The decision to hold a 
referendum was a direct outcome of Labour's internal struggles, with 
neither the Conservatives nor public opinion playing a part in that 
decision. 
V) Greater Unity? - Moves Towards A Referendum 
The first possible semblance of an official Party response came as early 
as September 1971 with Callaghan warning the Conservatives that should 
Labour win the next election it would be 'its intention to re-
negotiate...those terms which at the time will have been found 
objectionable and harmful to the interests of the British people.' The key 
word was 're-negotiate'.^®^ However, the idea of re-negotiation was slow 
to gain currency within the Party. Why then the delay? For anti-
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Marketeers, the best outcome would be for the party to commit itself 
wholly against entry and then for the party to win a future election as a 
result. The Government would withdraw Britain from the Common Market 
and there could be no question either of the Cabinet's going back on a 
pledge so categorically worded. However, most anti-Marketeers realised 
by 1972 that this was an unrealistic outcome. Wilson's refusal to support 
them as well as the behaviour of pro-Marketeers would have meant they 
would have captured a Party of little worth. So instead they were 
prepared to settle for a referendum. Though having reservations, Wilson 
finally came to accept the idea,^ ®^ as a way of avoiding party disunity.^^° It 
would also buy him time since he knew the need not come to a final 
decision until after an Election, where party dynamics would become less 
important.^^^ Resistance to entry was further weakened when President 
Pompidou announced a referendum on Community enlargement. While 
his decision was taken for domestic political reasons,^ ^^ it did provide anti 
Marketeers with the chance to persuade both the NEC and Shadow 
Cabinet to reverse their previous decisions. Now both the wider Party and 
PLP were committed to holding a referendum - the consequences of 
which were momentous. With the subsequent resignations of a number of 
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pro-Marketeers,^^^ indicating that any further slide away from Europe 
would split the Party, Wilson became even more determined to not permit 
the Party to come out openly against entry. The NEC's statement, linking 
the policy of re-negotiation to the policy of consulting the people,^ '^* was 
overwhelmingly carried at the 1972 Annual Conference and written 
verbatim into a general policy statement the following year.^ ^^ What had 
emerged was a policy that least divided the Party. Callaghan had been 
right when he observed, that the idea of a referendum was 'a life - raft into 
which the whole party (might) one day have to climb.'^ ^^ Even Jenkins 
eventually agreed to climb on board, standing successfully for re-election 
to the shadow cabinet in 1973.^ ®^ 
4. Conclusions 
Labour showed they were never convinced Europeans, adopting instead a 
policy of 'no decision'. From the outset Wilson believed that any decision 
on principle had to be made simultaneously with a decision on the terms 
of entry. Until such time, there was no case for antagonising the wider 
Party with a decision that could result in nothing. One of his strengths 
was in maintaining party unity through high levels of intra-party tension. 
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One aide notes that -'his tolerance and flexibility prevented a fatal 
rupture...made it possible for the Party to fight the 1974 elections 
reasonably united. Upon entering office in February 1974 Labour, 
therefore, called for there to be fundamental renegotiations of British 
entry. If the renegotiations yielded a satisfactory result, then Labour was 
determined to let the electorate make the final decision through a 
referendum. While Wilson was ultimately successful in creating a party 
consensus in favour of entry, the means of actually achieving this goal 
were often 'painfully difficult, and exasperating.'^^^ It was with such a 
division of opinion within the Party, that questions about the apparent 
ease with which anti-Marketeers accommodated themselves to the reality 
of 'Labour in Europe' need now to be answered. 
Can Wilson's behaviour be linked to efforts to fend off possible leadership 
challenges? This argument is generally doubted. As Deputy Leader, 
Jenkins made a number of speeches that were critical of Wilson, alluding 
to the dangers if he continued to follow public opinion. The press lionising 
Jenkins as a man of principle followed each of Wilson's addresses on 
E u r o p e . T h e culmination being an unsigned editorial in one political 
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journal stating that 'Mr. Wilson has proved himself unfit to be Leader. 
Such criticisms naturally led to expectations that a challenge was 
imminent. Swift denials of any challenge then predictably followed. This 
was a realistic assessment. For over one third of the signatures on the 
letter to Jenkins requesting him to obey the whip were from centrist MPs. 
Indeed, his reputation had also suffered by voting in the Opposition 
lobbies on second reading. Many who previously admired him were now 
calling into question his actual devotion to European cause. By accepting 
the pact, Jenkins was always going to receive criticism. Had he refused 
the pact he would have maintained his reputation as a man of principle. 
By accepting it, he angered those who saw a missed chance to inflict a 
deathblow to Heath. Assessed against this context, Jenkins' challenge 
can be seen as an effort to re-establish him with pro-Marketeers rather 
than as a serious threat to Wilson. Could then Callaghan have been the 
real danger as he had allowed himself to be identified as a 'neutral' in the 
debate? The idea of a leadership bid was certainly fostered by telling a 
reporter 'Well, if you want to hear the next leader of the Labour Party, 
you'd better arrange to be there.'^ °^ It was not surprising that Wilson 
began to fear Callaghan^^"* and thus be squeezed by a pincer movement 
between him and the Labour Left.^ °^ That a leadership bid was imminent 
was lent further weight by the support Callaghan drew from the Labour 
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Left, the wing, of course, which had been the bulwark for Wilson. But 
closer examination shows that Callaghan was acting as a Party unifier. 
Callaghan told a fellow Labour MP, that he was 'not interested in the 
leadership unless Harold decided to retire'. When one looks at the 
timing of his speeches, it Is clear that rather than taking the initiative away 
from Wilson, he was actually endorsing Wilson's growing anti-Market 
line.'^ °^ Having established that Wilson's position was never really 
threatened, we need to discuss Labour's approach both in principle and 
over the actual terms. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
P A R T Y UNITY & 
T H E R E F E R E N D U M 
WILSON'S TRIUMPH 
1. Introduction 
The 1973 Yom Kippur War brought to many western nations rises in 
energy costs, higher food prices and spiralling inflation. Wilson was also 
concerned by the need to develop a sustainable industrial relations policy. 
Yet with the unions demanding above inflation wage rises to counteract 
high inflation, this was never going to be easy.^ °^ He responded with a 
combination of borrowing, price controls and 'social contract'. While this 
could not be afforded, the hope was that North Sea oil production would 
be able to stabilise the balance of payments' position. So Wilson was 
trying to buy time.^ °® So it was from this position that he had to operate, 
with Europe only one issue among many. 
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2. First Moves 
With some rather anti-Market Labour pronouncements during the 1974 
election campaign, speculation grew as to whether Wilson could escape 
from the 'policy prison' inherited earlier. From the outset, both he and 
Callaghan worked hard^^° to display all the skills in party management that 
had been so well rehearsed in opposition. When Callaghan adopted a 
softer tone towards re-negotiations, Wilson reassured anti-Marketeers that 
his resolve was as strong as ever.^ ^^  It was this ambivalence that allowed 
a discernible change in emphasis to be achieved in such a relatively short 
time.^ ^^ Wilson's Cabinet after the February Election was anti-Market in 
composition, with prominent pro-Marketeers being given departments that 
were seen to have least bearing on Europe.^ ^^ Yet it was during these first 
few weeks that certain decisions were taken from which wider 
consequences flowed. Had the anti-Marketeers persuaded the Cabinet to 
insist on changes to Common Market treaties, the course of events might 
have been different. The Government could show, however, that as 
Labour was committed to re-negotiation, they would not ask for any Treaty 
changes. Wilson was well aware that it would have been almost 
impossible to obtain the consent to treaty revisions from all the other 
members. Equally Britain was not some outside body with which the 
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Community was negotiating - it was in the Community and had been for 
eighteen months. So while the bargaining went on so did the work of the 
Community.^ "^^  Anti-Marketeers were also in a weak position. With 
another election looming and with an insecure parliamentary position, any 
attempt to sabotage policy was likely to prove counter-productive. 
Instead, Labour Left Cabinet members became more absorbed in their 
departments and in keeping the party to the left on a range of issues of 
which Europe was only one. The Labour Left outside Parliament mirrored 
this too. The unions were far more interested in getting the Industrial 
Relations Act repealed than they were in taking Britain out of the 
Community. They would not have countenanced moves that might have 
jeopardised their industrial goals, by threatening the survival of the 
Government.^^^ 
Callaghan's tone at the beginning was reassuring to the Community, 
stressing that Britain would attempt to adapt and reshape the talks. For 
the Cabinet the tone was too mild and the influence of officials too 
apparent. So during a Council of Ministers meeting shortly after, 
Callaghan adopted a much tougher line, underlining the fact that 'a 
fundamental re-negotiation of the terms of entry' was sought.^ ^^ While 
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there was some shock among other foreign ministers^^^ with the 
'vehemence' that Callaghan sailed into the attack,^ ^® they understood that 
his tone had been determined by domestic political reasons. However, 
two incidents enabled pro-Market forces to gain momentum. First, the 
delay following Pompidou's death allowed Callaghan time to master his 
subject and allow several anti-Market Ministers to experience the flexibility 
of the Community. The appointment of Helmut Schmidt as West German 
Chancellor also helped because not only did he share Britain's impatience 
for Community rhetoric, he was also prepared to help in getting the terms 
accepted by the Party.^ ^^ Morgan argues that Schmidt was 'the dominant 
intellectual influence' on Callaghan's perceptions of international relations 
for the next five years During the next two months there was a 'sea 
change' in Callaghan's attitude as he began to see membership not just 
as a political device but as desirable in itself. By June 1974, therefore, he 
reassured the Community that Britain 'would not require changes in the 
treaties.'^ ^^ The tide now seemed to be flowing in a pro-Market direction. 
Callaghan had been able to deny the anti-Marketeers their chosen 
battleground. To argue against entry would have been to depart from the 
manifesto commitment to judge membership on the terms, and not on the 
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principle.^^^ In the event. Labour gained a majority of three in the 1974 
October Election. As in 1964 Wilson realised that his majority meant he 
could fight only one policy battle at a time, and that had to be over 
E u r o p e . T h e result also meant Callaghan had to 'throw himself into 
bringing the European renegotiating process to a conclusion.'^ ^"^ While at 
first anti-Marketeers supported the idea of a referendum, once opinion 
polls began to support membership,^^^ they tried to control the Party 
machine to force pro-Marketeers into opposing party policy. Their first 
push was at Annual Conference. 
It was remarkable that the return to office did not mark a new phase in the 
European debate within the Party, with the central arguments focusing on 
the effects on inflation, wages and employment. But if anything did 
distinguish this period it was the emergence of parliamentary sovereignty, 
with many seeing entry as an impediment to the freedom to move in a 
socialist direction^^^ So the debate had little to do with terms of entry and 
more to do with the conceptual themes surrounding the Community. It 
was in this context that delegates made their way down to Annual 
Conference. 
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3. The 1974 Labour Party Conference 
A Conference fringe meeting indicated opposition to entry with Clive 
Jenkins declaring that every minister should 'campaign against continued 
membership or resign from the Cabinet.^ ^^ The fact that Conference 
passed an anti-Market motion served as a reminder of the strength of 
Party feel ing.However, on the final day there was a change of mood^^^ 
with Helmut Schmidt addressing delegates. His role in 'shepherding' 
Labour through its European troubles at this time should not be 
underestimated.While there was speculation whether anti-Marketeers 
would orchestrate opposition to the speech, the West German Chancellor 
was warmly received,speaking flatteringly about Labour's contribution 
to the welfare state.^ ^^ What was more significant was that he persuaded 
Wilson to support a YES vote in any future referendum.^^^ Yet at the 
same time there was a feeling of inevitability about the renegotiations.^ '^* 
The policy shift continued where Wilson made it clear that real progress 
was being made.^ ^^ However, while anti-Marketeers now argued that talk 
of a 'European Union' revealed the threat to national sovereignty, Wilson 
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insisted that the Government was still loyal to its manifesto pledge, whilst 
reverting to 'reducing everything to a boring...low key."^ ^® For the most 
part he was successful in that the doctrine of collective responsibility 
continued to be o b s e r v e d . W i t h early divisions now beginning to 
emerge, most notably between Benn and Hattersley,^ ^^ there now seemed 
little prospect of maintaining unity whatever the result of the re-
negotiations. Wilson seeing no other option told the Cabinet that they 
may 'agree to differ'^ ^ i^n public. 
As the re-negotiations proceeded, many manifesto commitments were 
either subsumed by the Community's own agenda or simply overtaken by 
events. Widespread fears that the CAP would lead to increased food 
prices were largely dissipated by world food price rises. Fears of 
interference in fiscal policies proved equally groundless. On the contrary, 
when Brussels established its new Regional Fund, it was decided that 
Britain should be a major beneficiary. So far as the Third World was 
concerned, the Community turned out to be far more outward looking than 
the British had ever imagined. The one item that might have caused 
difficulties was the size of Britain's contribution to the Community budget. 
Both Labour and Conservative Governments had felt that Britain was 
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paying too much.'^''° So at the Dublin summit in March 1975, agreement 
was reached both on the details of a 'correcting mechanism' and on the 
access of New Zealand produces to British markets. In claiming to have 
relatives there,^ '*^ Wilson was identifying himself with British people, many 
of whom had relatives there. It was a typically populist touch - one made 
presumably with the forthcoming referendum campaign in mind. While 
budget agreement had already been reached in private, Wilson kept the 
issue on the table for a little longer, so as to portray him as a defender of 
British interests.^ "^ ^ Then, satisfied with what had been achieved, a two-day 
Cabinet meeting was held. The views that were expressed followed fairly 
predictable lines, with Benn talking of the sacrifice of sovereignty and 
condemning the Common Market as a capitalist club.^ "*^  Wilson and 
Callaghan both argued that membership was now less costly than 
expected and that Britain's international role was actually now 
strengthened by it. However, with the more mildly anti-Market Ministers, 
now swinging behind Wilson, it was no surprise that Cabinet supported 
the agreed terms.^ '^ '^  Wilson had achieved his main aim of pushing 
through the renegotiations without harming party unity,^ '*^  Failure of anti-
Marketeers to insist on the Treaties being amended, meant that re-
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negotiations became merely a cosmetic exercise. With Britain having 
persuaded the Community to revise budgetary policy, the process 
demonstrated that London could exercise leverage through membership. 
And the longer Britain was a member the more those who favoured the 
status quo would feel more comfortable. If Ministers became used to 
working within the framework of the Community, then the idea of 
membership might become more popular with them.^ "*^  While in 
Opposition Wilson found it easy to view entry in terms of domestic political 
manoeuvring, in Government his position had to be operable with all that 
implied for the internal politics of the party.^ "*^  So with the Cabinet now 
recommending a YES vote, wider party reaction came to an immediate 
head.^ "*^  at the NEC's EEC Liaison Committee in March 1975. 
With the argument being waged paragraph by paragraph, the most 
serious conflict concerned North Sea oil. Would Britain retain control over 
pricing policy by selling oil in Britain below world prices if the Government 
thought it necessary? Benn argued no country could supply oil to one 
country more cheaply than it supplied it to EEC countries. But these were 
not grounds Callaghan wished to fight on. For him, membership was 
important for the part Britain could play in international affairs.^ "*^  
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However, the Committee's rejection of the terms warned him that an 
organised Party campaign could make life very uncomfortable. And 
indeed, a motion was tabled at the following NEC, calling for outright 
condemnation of the re-negotiated terms. It was clear; therefore, that an 
anti-Market party run campaign would split the party even more deeply 
and possibly embarrass the Government on other issues as well.^ ^° 
However, both Wilson and Callaghan let it be known that they would 
resign if the Party campaigned openly against the Government.^ ^^ Why 
had Wilson threatened this? By making his support for membership 
unambiguous he had exposed himself to the wrath of the Labour Left - his 
tribal base, leading one commentator to note that he now depended for 
survival on the Labour Right - those for whom he had suspected for 
years.'^ ^^ The NEC and Conference were both against him as were 
Transport House. The PLP had, of course, already deserted him on the 
October Commons Vote. Indeed, it did look perilously close to a 1931 
situation with a Labour Government at odds with its own supporters being 
kept in office with opposition support. Wilson also feared that he would 
find himself without any protection against the clinical hostility of the 
Labour Right which would cut his bloody throat' once he had served his 
purpose over Europe.^ ^^ 
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Yet in the short term, the threat of resignation seemed to work. When the 
NEC voted to recommend withdrawal, two crucial riders were added - that 
there would be no finances for a campaign and that 'the right to differ' 
should apply to party members who opposed the NEC's line just as it 
applied to the Government.^ ^"* In short, the Party's voice would be 
m u t e d . W h i l e Conference could repudiate the terms, Wilson was 
convinced that the 'sting' had been taken out of the issue.^ ^® While 
conference voted in favour of withdrawal,^" it was agreed that the Party 
would remain neutral. The fact still remained that the Government found 
most of its own supporters against it. In these circumstances, Wilson's 
mood might have been one of gloom. Instead, it was one of optimism as 
public opinion had by now swung around. It also seemed probable that 
those with anti-Market views were more likely to change their minds or not 
vote than those of a pro-Market predisposit ion.It was crucially against 
this background that Wilson took the decision to hold a referendum. The 
advantage of a referendum now was that it largely externalised the issue 
with there being no accusation of betrayal since the conflict was being 
conducted with both lobbies collaborating with the opposition parties. So 
it was now the anti-Europeans who wondered whether the referendum 
was such a good idea after all. 
353 Pimlott B. op cit. pp. 657 - 658 
354 George S . op cit. p. 93 
355 Hitchens C. & Kellner P. op cit. pp. 160-164 
356 Robins L .J . op cit. p. 126 
357 Labour Weekly 23. 5.1975 
101 
4. The Referendum Campaign 
It was self-evident to everyone involved that the referendum could not be 
run along partisan lines with pro- and anti-Marketeers to be found in both 
major parties It followed that what was required was two umbrella 
organisations to function as single-issue political parties.^ ^® Both the YES 
organisation, Britain in Europe, and NO organisation, the National 
Referendum Campaign, were keen not to identify itself with either major 
political party. As for the campaign itself, Wilson tried not excite 
anybody,^^° intending to play it down throughout.^ ^^ The final result 
showed a landslide for the pro-Marketeers,^^^ with one daily newspaper 
referring to the result as 'a tonic for Britain and a tonic for Europe.'^ ®^ The 
electorate appeared to have voted Yes on the basis of the support given 
by Wilson and Callaghan.^ ®'* Yet while the verdict was not necessarily a 
vote of confidence, it may have been an expression of fear that things 
would be worse outside the Community.^ ®^ There is also no doubt that 
some appearance of unity was promoted because many in the PLP were 
not prepared to engage in public controversy, believing that the new terms 
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were certainly an improvement. This seemed to be the case with some 
Labour members who were known to be committed on the issue but who 
were no longer prepared to give It top priority. In addition, some centrist 
leaning anti-Marketeers limited their campaigning, fearing a victory would 
strengthen the Labour Left.^ ^^ And so with all the manoeuvring, it is worth 
wondering what would have happened if the vote had been 'NO'. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that the Government could have carried out such a 
policy, as Williams and Jenkins had said that a NO vote would result in 
their resignations. Had they done so a number of other Cabinet members 
would have resigned as well. With these Ministers holding much support 
among the pro-Marketeers on the backbenches, it is doubtful whether 
Wilson could have survived. A No vote would have weakened the 
positions of both Wilson and Callaghan in the wider party and 
strengthened the positions of figures like Benn. Taken together, the 
election of either Foot or Benn as Party leader and the resignations of 
Jenkins, Williams and others could have precipitated a split, with the 
consequence of the Party remaining in opposition for a generation. 
Indeed, for anti-Marketeers like Benn the referendum had backfired, 
with him becoming 'marginalised'^^^ accepting demotion to the Department 
of Energy. While they had clearly been humiliated, this did not mean that 
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the Labour Left lost seats on the executives of powerful trade unions or 
their seats on the NEC or, for that matter, their popular support at 
Conference. 
5. Conclusions 
The most decisive act in preserving Common Market membership was the 
Referendum. The decision to hold one, taken for reasons of party unity, 
enabled a decisive endorsement of membership to be agreed if not the 
party. There could hardly be a clearer example of the consensus being 
maintained.^^^ The decision to conduct a referendum was an 'act of 
genius' as it enabled Labour to remain un i ted ,and enabled Wilson to 
project himself in Europe as an international s ta tesman .The Labour 
Party supported a governmental consensus about the future role of Britain 
in Europe. While in Opposition it was more concerned with sustaining 
party unity and opposing the Tory Government, in Government it adopted 
a clear pro-Market line. While there was always the possibility of a split, 
for 45 years they had always managed to sustain unity. However, the 
European issue had succeeded in dividing Labour in that, while it never 
entirely coincided with the basic division between right and left, it had 
helped to crystallise the normal conflicts of ideology for power. In the 
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1970s, schism was seen as a growing hazard and Europe as the issue 
that could easily precipitate a split. So as Party leader, Wilson saw a 
referendum as the best way to hold the Party together - while the antis 
would not leave the Party over Europe, the pros most probably would. 
The Referendum thus removed a threat to Labour's future.^ ^^ It was a way 
of maintaining the 'normal' British Government pro-European stance. The 
wider implications of Britain's relations with any kind of Europe were swept 
to one side. '^''* Most of those two years had been spent in pursuing a 
policy towards the Community that was driven by the imperatives of 
domestic politics. The need to hold the Party and the country together 
had dictated the sometimes-aggressive tone of the renegotiations. Some 
further damage had been done to the reputation of Britain with its 
Community partners, but there had been general relief when the 
referendum result went in favour of continued membership. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
CONFLICT AND DISCORD: 
THE LABOUR PARTY, EUROPE AND 
CONSENSUS POLITICS 1960 - 1975 
Throughout the many debates that took place over Common Market entry, 
the issue of retaining party unity remained constant throughout. Under 
Gaitskell's reign the party was able to find unity as the 'Commonwealth 
Party'. From the time of the French veto, he was able to calculate the 
negotiations would probably fail and that his subsequent repositioning to 
that of fervent anti Marketeer can, therefore, be interpreted as an attempt 
to reinforce French concerns and bring about a defeat for the Government 
with any electoral spin off that may accrue. 
With regard to Wilson's leadership, a number of points need to be 
addressed. We have shown that despite being an endemically divided 
party. Labour was able to achieve and then sustain a fairly high degree of 
unity on Common Market membership. His management style suggests 
he genuinely wanted negotiations with the Six to be successful. It was a 
measure of his political acumen that he was able to gain tacit Cabinet 
support in principle for entry without a single resignation. He did this by 
never addressing the wider picture but by merely exploring the many 
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details linked to possible membership. When Labour found itself in 
Opposition Wilson decided that in the interests of preserving party unity no 
firm decision should be taken. With a decision on principle clearly linked 
to the quality of available terms, he saw very little case for antagonising 
the party at large with making a decision that seemed to have no finality at 
that stage to it. This position was to change of course by 1975 as Labour 
was again in government. He could now control events. And perhaps 
one of his greatest strengths as leader was to still maintain party unity on 
this still highly sensitive issue through the use of a referendum. By 
utilising such a device he was able to take the debate outside the party 
machinery and so almost deanaestise party feeling. The debate was 
therefore no longer merely an internal party battle it was a national 
debate. His ability to nurture the negotiations so that a commanding Yes 
vote was achieved also shows his skill maintaining the European policy 
consensus. Yet immediately following his sudden departure from office in 
1976, divisions over Europe began to resurface once again and to an 
extent that it looked as if the Party would finally implode. With the Party 
moving to the left after the 1979 General Election it similarly moved to a 
position of outright opposition to EEC entry. In fact withdrawal became 
one of the central planks in the civil war that begun to engulf the party and 
was a contributing factor in the creation of the SDP some years later. Its 
probable that the referendum campaign drove home to the Labour Right 
the realisation of the huge gulf that now separated them on the important 
issue of Europe. The leadership election following Wilson's resignation 
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only revealed too vividly the weak strategic position of the Labour Right on 
the party in general. Linked to this point was of course the advance of the 
Labour left in broad policy making, having the effect of reducing the 
recruiting power of the Labour Right. So by 1979, therefore, the Labour 
Right were in a very poor organisational position with certain leading 
members now holding the view that a new more centralist party need be 
created. The 1980 Wembley Conference only served to exacerbate this 
view. So in many ways the unity built by Wilson can be viewed as having 
been built on foundations of sand. A breakaway had now occurred the 
like of which had not been seen in the Party for over 40 years. Having 
said this, we do need to set this against a wider historical framework. 
While it is true that a split took place, one still needs to remember that 
throughout the haemorrhaging that took place still remained in tact. 
Despite being often pushed to the very limits it found itself able to fight the 
following 1983 election as one party. So perhaps given the high levels of 
division that had occurred, especially in the early 1970's, it was perhaps 
Wilson's ability to prevent an even more everiasting split that should 
ultimately be remembered. This point is crucial. Without the unifying 
actions of Wilson it is quite possible to argue that not only would the 
Labour Party not have survived as a major political force but also that the 
British Governments policy consensus over Europe may have been halted 
or at best interrupted. 
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